Japanese Troops on the Move

In a previous post, we saw how Beijing was already exploring the idea of military intervention in Siberia in February 1918. The Duan government went so far as to sign a Joint Military Defence Agreement with Japan in May, with an eye to “defensive action” against the influence of the Central Powers in Russia. As long as Allied opinion remained divided, however, actual deployment proved elusive. Washington was concerned about the impact on Russian public opinion, as well as the potential for expanding Japan’s influence in Northeast Asia. The Japanese government was split between hawks and doves, with the former kept restrained by America’s lukewarm attitude.

The Czechoslovak Legion’s revolt in summer 1918 broke the deadlock. In America, military intervention could now be sold as assistance to the embattled Legion, fighting heroically against German and Austrian POWs. On 6 July, Washington decided in favour of intervention. This gave the Japanese hawks the ammunition they needed and, on 16 July, the Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs (Gaiko Chosakai) approved a draft calling for the deployment of an unrestricted number of troops to Siberia.

Commemorative postcards of the 14th Division’s deployment to Siberia. The division headquarters were in Utsunomiya. Source.

Even before this, however, the Japanese military began increasing its support for anti-bolshevik forces. Military advisors had been dispatched to both Semenov and Horvath since the beginning of 1918. Now a steady stream of soldiers began trickling towards the front, much to the alarm of Chinese officials.

協約各國共同出兵問題，已有動機，不久必見諸事實等情，曾於有日電呈在案，已邀鈞鑒。頃據確實探報，近有日本兵士，俱著便服，或一、二百，或三、五百名不等，由南滿、中東兩路陸續至海參崴、哈爾濱、滿洲裡等處。雖未持有槍械，而隨行車上，各載有木箱若干，內裝何物，不許他人過問，復不受檢查，其為暗運槍彈，不問可知。此項兵士，系該國之義勇隊與退伍之陸軍，便裝出發，分布崴、哈等處，並不頒布動員令，以防各國之詰責。其用意至深，其居心叵測。從各方面探得確實消息，征以本署顧問齊藤中佐之言，大約以義勇隊赴滿助謝，以退伍之陸軍為共同出兵之前驅。一俟協約國實行出兵時，彼即改易軍服，集而成軍等情。謹電馳聞。伏乞垂鑒。

On the issue of joint Allied intervention, there have been some developments and we will soon see the truth of the matter. I had previously wired about this on the 25th for your perusal. Now, according to accurate reports, there have recently been Japanese soldiers dressed in civilian uniforms, in groups of 100-200 or 300-500, travelling in succession via the South Manchurian and Chinese Eastern Railways to Vladivostok, Harbin and Manzhouli. Although they are not bearing arms, they are accompanied by trains each carrying several wooden crates. As for what these contain, they do not permit others to enquire and will not submit to checks. That they are being used to secretly transport weapons need not even be asked. These soldiers are volunteers and demobilised infantrymen of that country, leaving in civilian clothes and stationed in Vladivostok, Harbin etc. Moreover, no mobilisation order has been announced in order to forestall questions from other countries. Their intentions are extremely obscure and it is hard to guess at their purposes. Based on accurate information obtained from various sources, an enquiry was made with Colonel Saito – an advisor with my office – who said it is likely that the volunteers are going to Manzhouli to aid Semenov and the demobilised infantry will be frontline troops for the joint intervention. Once the Allies carry out the intervention, they will immediately switch to military uniform and assemble as a force. For your kind consideration.

Telegram from Meng Enyuan, 28 July 1918. Zhong-e guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919): chubing Xiboliya, p. 224.

Postcard commemorating the Japanese military presence in Sakhalin, depicting the 32nd Regiment leaving Aomori. Source.

Semenov had been under pressure from the Reds at Manzhouli since June, and some of the soldiers mentioned in Meng’s telegram were indeed members of a 500-strong volunteer battalion – organised by Major-General Muto Nobuyoshi – sent to rescue him. In April, the Japanese had also landed several hundred troops from their warships in Vladivostok, providing cover for the demobilised soldiers. But whatever the exact number or destination of these forces, they were a sign of the Imperial Japanese Army’s broad scope of action in Manchuria and the Russian Far East. Already in February, Vice-Chief of Staff Tanaka Giichi, one of the foremost advocates of unilateral intervention, had set up a secret Military Affairs Cooperative Committee to prepare for full-scale operations in Siberia. And even as the Terauchi government and the popular press debated the desirability of intervention, the army general staff had a free hand in sponsoring anti-bolshevik clients and mobilising emigre volunteers.

More galling for Meng – in spite of his own entanglements with Japanese advisors –  was China’s inability to do anything about these troop movements. The Joint Defence Agreement expressly permitted the Japanese army to use the CER for military purposes, as long as it did not contravene the original Sino-Russian railway treaties. This was the first inkling that Duan Qirui’s appeasement of the Japanese would have dire consequences for China’s authority over the Railway zone.

Japanese troops landing in Vladivostok, 12 August 1918. Source.

On 2 August, after an exchange of notes with the Americans, the Japanese government officially announced its intention to send its forces to Vladivostok. This was framed as a response to German and POW activity in Russia and a defence against “chaos”. What was missing, however, was a firm commitment to the American proviso that the number of troops be limited to 7,000. Instead, the Japanese reserved the right to send reinforcements if necessary, following consultation with the Allies. Troops could also be deployed in areas other than Vladivostok.

With the brakes now taken off the Imperial Japanese Army, there was no more need for subterfuge. The first elements of the 12th Division left Kokura for Vladivostok on 10 August; one day after they landed, the division commander requested immediate reinforcements. The Japanese government then agreed that the 7th Division, stationed along the South Manchurian Railway, would be sent to bolster Semenov in Manzhouli, directly contravening the original declaration but permissible under the Sino-Japanese Joint Defence Agreement. These were followed by yet further reinforcements from South Manchuria called up by the general staff, asserting its “right of supreme command” in the battlefield without consulting civilian politicians. Just three weeks after the Japanese announcement, the stage was set for large-scale military operations across East Siberia and the Russian Far East.

Two Siberian Governments

As the Czechoslovak Legion rose in revolt in summer 1918, it was followed by a number of anti-bolshevik regimes taking advantage of the power vacuum. A moderate socialist government sprung up in Vladivostok under the Socialist Revolutionary P.Ia. Derber, while at Grodekovo a rather more authoritarian group claimed power under D.L. Horvath. Both were quick to issue declarations to an international audience, including China.

The legionnaires in Vladivostok. Source.

The first communique to arrive was from Derber’s Provisional Government of Autnomous Siberia:

為繼續本年七月八日西比利亞自治臨時政府向各友邦之聲明，並根據七月十五日政府之特別決定，茲西伯利亞自治臨時政府通知如下：

「西伯利亞自治臨時政府甚願証明中俄兩國原有之友誼，請轉達貴政府，當此公敵脅迫之時，中俄兩國之武力亟應趕早聯合。中俄兩國，當知日后奧、德兵力深入俄國中心及西比利亞之影響。且西比利亞及俄境，尚有多數俘虜自由行動，已足令人疑懼。西比利亞自治臨時政府，欲達聯合目的，並有不能迅速召集全俄兵力之難處，政府特囑轉請貴部將貴政府對於聯軍組織俄德新戰線之看法意見，加以研究見告。

查俄國土地之主權，政府自應保全，貴政府之實在意見如為實行公同問題，無礙俄國土地主權，則西比利亞自治臨時政府必表歡迎。現據余個人盼望，目前最要之事，中俄兩國政府從速開始談判，研究公共行動之條件，以實行此項公共問題，深盼將貴政府之答覆，速為見告為荷。班脫落夫(Petroff)代總長署名。」

Subsequent to the 8 July declaration of the Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia [hereafter PGAS] to the Friendly Powers, and on the basis of a 15 July special resolution of the Government, the PGAS announces the following:

‘The PGAS sincerely wishes to confirm the friendship that exists between the two countries of China and Russia, and requests that You convey to Your Government, at this time of threat from our common enemy, the utmost desirability of a swift union between the military forces of China and Russia. China and Russia must know the consequences of the advance of the Austrian and German forces into the heart of Russia and Siberia. And in Siberia and Russia, a large number of POWs continues to act independently, which is sufficient to cause concern. The PGAS, in conveying the desirability of the union, also cites the difficulty of rapidly mobilising all forces in Russia. The Government thus requests Your Ministry to study and communicate the views and intentions of Your Government regarding the organisation of a new Russo-German front through a military alliance.

‘The territorial sovereignty of Russia must be safeguarded by this Government. Your Government’s real intentions for the resolution of our common problems – if they do not infringe on the territorial sovereignty of Russia – will be welcomed by the PGAS. My personal hope, with regards to the most pressing issue now, is for the Chinese and Russian governments to enter into immediate talks to study the conditions for joint action, in order to resolve these common problems. I sincerely hope that You will be so kind as to swiftly convey Your Government’s response. For the Minister, [Arkadii N.] Petroff.’

Telegram from the PGAS in Vladivostok, 16 July 1918. Zhong-E guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919). E zhengbian yu yiban jiaoshe (1), p. 449.

The Chinese were not Derber’s sole intended recipients; in fact, this same telegram was also sent to the Americans and the references to “China and Russia” are absent in the French original. Nevertheless, Derber was no stranger to the Chinese. Already in February, his Extraordinary Siberian Regional Congress in Tomsk had reached out directly to the Beijing Foreign Ministry to request recognition as a provisional Russian government. Out of all the other anti-bolshevik groups, Derber’s were the only ones to make first-hand contact with Beijing.

Horvath at a military parade in Vladivostok, 1918. Source.

For his part, Horvath dispatched a lengthy missive via Ambassador Kudashev:

俄中將霍爾瓦特致駐京俄使電
按諸若干外國人發表之意見，聯盟國軍隊似欲於其所到地方一經佔領之后，決定建設一行政機關，此項機關或且屬於外國者一與德人所設者同列，對於俄國臨時政府一概不予承認，各級之人民對於如此之措置，似屬不表歡迎。聯盟各國行且因此喪失一切之情誼，此固明顯之事理而無俟指示者也。無論如何之民族，皆不能靜受外國人之勢力，因佔領之事實，聯盟國在此境土中或至造成無定之時勢，且於重組織俄軍，再整俄陣之主旨，亦似難達其目的。在俄國土中，只有唯一外國之戰線，此為聯盟國僅有之利益，因在東方戰線實有極力集中兵力之必要也。如聯盟國果副一般之期望，其來俄也，系為扶助維持致力重行作戰之俄國執政，以便從新抵御吾人之公敵，謀戰爭終局之勝利，恢復國內對於此旨必要正當之秩序，則完全別開之時局且將隨之而誕生矣。茲即此類之政權而論，欲令其創一主政之機關，開始即能應副各類人民之欲望，實覺戛乎其難。下級之人民皆已浸淫包洛士維及無政府主義，獨有迎合極下人民之天性，表示寬大之執行者，始能取悅於彼輩。但執行者如此無能，不能恢復正當秩序，則一般抱有公民原則之人民，對之自亦不能容忍也。集合而成之政權，即如前臨時政府，其無力之憑証，亦已揭示於天下。極端反對各黨之意見，實屬難以結合，因為無益之紛爭，渾沌猶疑之政策，欲使國人皆悅，反至費時失事，此即集合政府之結果，而使國家至於現在破裂之情形也。

俄國每當困難時代，例如今日之情形，必須將惟一確定之政權付諸獨一之人物，因其經歷及就濡染民意之政黨中所得之物望，而斡商時局，始得良好之結果，征諸史乘往事，實多先例。故吾一本斯旨，建設政府，以各種不同之分子組成之，無分黨派皆一致於實力發展之方策，且隨其前進之程途，以為新立國者完成有益之比例，至於召集國會，交付政權而后已。至若改變之危險，因內閣援引各種不同之分子，無論如何皆可無慮。聯盟各國盡可派員視察此項政權之實力，並將各該本國政府對於日行問題之意見，轉告一切。即請貴公使將以上各節轉達各駐在國政府，並再請其協助吾人所建之政府，此項政府實系欲與聯盟各國同為一致之行動，並受有各處多數承認之宣告者也。因不能與華盛頓、倫敦、巴黎、羅馬各處直接通信，即希將此電轉致駐在各該處本國代表為荷。

Telegram from General Horvath to the Russian Ambassador in Beijing (23 July 1918, sent 10 July)
According to the opinion expressed by several foreigners, it seems that the Allied forces, upon occupying the areas they have entered, have resolved to establish an administrative organ. Were such an organ to belong to foreigners, it would be the same as those established by the Germans. It would give absolutely no recognition to the Russian Provisional Government and the various classes would not welcome such an arrangement. The Allies will, because of this, forfeit all goodwill – this much is evident and goes without saying. No people will quietly endure a foreign power. Because of the realities of their occupation, the Allies may create an unstable situation in these territories. And as for the intention to reorganise Russian forces and restore the Russian front, it will make it harder to achieve these aims. In Russian territory there is only one foreign battlefront; this is the sole interest of the Allies, since there is a pressing need to concentrate all military forces on the Eastern Front. If the Allies are indeed adhering to the wishes of all, their presence in Russia would be to support and maintain a Russian administration that is working towards resuming the war effort, in order to once again resist our common enemy, carry the war to final victory, and restore the domestic order necessary and appropriate for this purpose. Entirely new situations will constantly emerge out of this.

American poster for war stamps, 1918. Source.

Speaking of such an authority, for it to establish a ruling body which could abide by the wishes of all people from the beginning would be extremely difficult. The lower classes have already been steeped in bolshevism and anarchism. Only a leader who panders to the natural tendencies of the lowest class of people and expresses magnanimity can win the approval of such types. But such a leader would be ineffectual, unable to restore the proper order, and ordinary people who hold to the principles of citizenship will naturally not tolerate it. The ineptitude of a political authority formed out of an assembly, such as was evident with the former Provisional Government, is already clear to all. With the diametrically opposing views of all the parties, it will be hard to unite them. Thus fruitless disputes and chaotic and ambivalent policies, intended to benefit the citizenry, instead waste time and fail. Such is the outcome of a government by assembly, which has brought the country to its current fractured state.

In all times of trouble, such as today, Russia has had to vest sole and firm authority in one person, since by his experience he may guide the common will as expressed by a governing party that reflects the people’s wishes. Thus he may turn things around and obtain a positive outcome. Going by the histories and past events, there are indeed many precedents for this. Hence my guiding principle is to establish a government made up of varying elements, without party divisions, all working together diligently to develop its strategy. As it advances and achieves a scale suitable for state-building, it will convene a national assembly, hand over power and cease its activities. As for the dangers of such a change, since the Cabinet draws upon diverse elements, there need not be any misgivings. The Allies may send representatives to observe the strength of this authority and communicate all opinions on everyday questions among the various governments. Thus, I ask Your Excellencies to convey the above to the governments of the countries where you are stationed, and to request again that they support the government I have established. This government truly wishes to act in concert with the Allies and has received statements of recognition from many areas. Since I am unable to communicate with Washington, London, Paris and Rome directly, I request that this be conveyed to our country’s representatives there.

Letter from Ambassador Kudashev, 27 July 1918 (sent 26 July). Ibid., pp. 459-460.

Horvath had already issued a declaration on 9 July on the formation of a new provisional government, which also set out some immediate policies. By contrast, this later statement laid out more general governing principles and wasted no time in taking a swipe at the Allies, who were more inclined to aid the Czechoslovaks than throw their weight behind yet another Russian regime of dubious longevity.

China’s approach to the two declarations was deeply informed by the Allied attitude, especially those of the Americans and the Czechoslovaks. In mid-July, two missions were sent to sound out the Horvath regime. They concluded that he had the support of neither the Americans nor the Legion, partly because of his authoritarian views; the more democratic Derber group, on the other hand, did. But without any control over actual “military forces” – and with Allied intervention gaining momentum – the Derber group soon proved a dead letter, their message not warrenting even a brief consultation with Ambassador Kudashev. Beijing’s focus now turned to its role in the interventionary effort and the resumption of the civil war on a new scale.

Horvath Moves into Russia

In a previous post, we saw how the revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion ousted local soviets along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Anti-bolshevik governments of varying stripes sprung up in their wake. A moderate socialist regime emerged in Vladivostok under P.Ia. Derber and, as the Czechoslovaks advanced from Vladivostok to Nikol’sk-Ussuriisk in early July, emboldened White forces captured Grodekovo on the Sino-Russian border. For Horvath in Harbin, the chance to take his fledgling regime to Russia – and away from the disapproval of the Chinese authorities – was irresistable.

By this stage, Chinese officials had been attempting to thwart Horvath’s organisational efforts in China for several months. Harbin foreign affairs official Li Jiaao, one of several interlocutors charged with keeping the Horvath group in line, described the announcement of the move to Grodekovo.

Horvath’s cabinet in Grodekovo, including (from left) S.A. Taskin, A.M. Okorokov, V.A. Glukharev, M.O. Kurskii, V.E. Flug, L.A. Ustrugov, S.V. Vostrotin. Source.

五日電計先邀覽。昨赴霍處阻止在路線界內組織政府，渠稱：

「業定今晚赴﹝四？﹞站察看情形，或赴雙城子圖晤赤軍，預備組織，萬一不洽，立即折回。萬一徼幸，當請假一月，即在雙城子組織政府，以扼海參崴西伯利亞政府，免致第二激黨出現。」

旋晤日英領事，談及此事，均贊成，惟美領事似不以為然，恐未能多談。今又赴晤，據稱：「昨晚霍同行者，除彼同志八十八人外，尚有日本國武員八人，英國武員一人。」又聞有日軍四百在軍助戰，詢諸日本領事，亦明認三百，則日英之助霍已確，無怪霍欣然而去。經交涉再三勸阻，且告以：「出境雖異﹝易﹞，入境恐難，二十年心血經營之鐵路，將付諸東流乎。」渠雖嘆息再三，仍難中止，則此中或有他故。

美領事亦經疑及霍與東人有約，勸我及早收回主權，美國必相助。若果落到東人，亦祇能以奉路相看，不承認安置軍隊，管理地方，緣此路合同尚在，不能與南滿洲同日而語。且雲：「霍與美人素來異視，如英日禁其在哈購地，美人則無此權利，萬難甘心，本領事將呈請政府趁此時期交涉，使中國主權得以完全收回。」交涉員告以：「中國與美國交誼最睦，當將尊意電達政府。」渠即欣悅道感。窺此情形，霍之改赴境外組織，系美領事之力也。

美領事既有助我收回主權之意，我國可乘機速圖進行。況近來日本國軍、警、財政人員絡繹來哈，雖以調查為名，似有布置。我國兵力未足，應如何籌備之處，宜未雨綢繆。是否有當，侯電遵。

I trust that the telegram of the 5th has been received. Yesterday, I went to Horvath to prevent the formation of a government in the Railway zone. He said:

‘I have already decided to go to Grodekovo this evening to observe the situation, and may proceed to Nikol’sk-Ussuriisk with the intention of meeting the Czech troops to prepare for an organisation. If we cannot come to an agreement, I will immediately return. If, against the odds, I succeed, I will take a month’s leave and establish a government in Ussuriisk, in order to seize the Siberian [Derber] government in Vladivostok and prevent a second bolshevik party from emerging.’

Li Jiaao, Harbin foreign affairs official from April 1918 to February 1919. Source.

I then went to meet the Japanese and British consuls. Speaking of this matter, they both approved, but it seemed that the American consul objected and it could not be discussed further. Today I met him [the American consul] again. He said, ‘Last night, among those who travelled with Horvath, apart from 88 of his comrades there were also eight Japanese and one British officer.’ He had also heard that there were 400 Japanese soldiers among the troops, aiding them in battle, and made enquiries with the Japanese consul, who admitted that there were 300 of them. Since it is now clear that the Japanese and British are helping Horvath, it is little wonder that he left so buoyantly. During our negotiations I repeatedly advised him against it, telling him, ‘It is easy to leave the border, but entering it may be difficult. The Railway, run with such toil and sweat over 20 years, will be swept away.’ Although he sighed several times, he could not break things off, or there may be other reasons for this.

The American consul has also already suspected Horvath of having an agreement with the easterners [Japanese], and advised us to recover our sovereignty as soon as possible, which America will support [emphasis mine]. If it does indeed fall to the easterners, they should be regarded as only serving the Railway, not permitted to station troops or manage the area, since the Railway agreement is still in force and it cannot be treated the same as the South Manchurian Railway. He then said, ‘Horvath and the Americans have never seen eye to eye. Like the British and Japanese, who are prohibited from buying land in Harbin[?], the Americans have no such privileges. This is far from satisfactory. I will write to my government to take this opportunity for negotiations, such that Chinese sovereignty may be completely recovered.’ I told him, ‘The friendship between China and America is most cordial, I will convey your opinion to our government.’ He then thanked us warmly. Judging by this situation, Horvath’s shift towards establishing a government outside the border must be the American consul’s doing.

Since the American consul intends to help us recover our sovereignty, our country may take this opportunity and swiftly make plans to proceed. After all, Japanese troops, police and finance officials have recently been coming to Harbin in droves. Although they claim to be observers, they seem to have other assignments. Our country’s military strength is still insufficient and, no matter what preparations should be made, we must plan for all contingencies. As for whether this is appropriate, I await your instructions.

Telegram from Li Jiaao, 10 July 1918 (sent 8 July). Zhong-E guanxi shiliao, Minguo liunian zhi banian (1917-1919). Dongbei bianfang (1), p. 277.

Chinese officials welcoming the Stevens mission in Harbin. Source.

Even before his departure from Harbin, therefore, Horvath’s ambitions were lofty in the extreme. On 9 July, he proclaimed himself Provisional Supreme Ruler of Russia in Grodekovo, in direct opposition to the Derber government. Unlike in his statement to Li, Horvath undertook this without an agreement with the Czechoslovaks, who controlled Nikol’sk-Ussuriisk. Worse still, he denied them passage on the Chinese Eastern Railway, which they had requested in order to aid fellow legionnaires in western Siberia.

Perhaps even more breathtaking was Li’s claim that the American consul in Harbin, Charles Moser, had openly voiced his support for the recovery of Chinese sovereignty over the Railway zone. Already in March 1918, the American-led Russian Railway Service Corps – helmed by engineer John F. Stevens – had established its presence on the CER in order to facilitate the smooth running of the line. Given the pressing needs of the Czechoslovak Legion, it seems highly unlikely that Moser would suggest anything that would destabilise the Railway. Neither was it in American interests to transplant Horvath to Russia; again, this only antagonised the Czechoslovaks and the Derber government.

Li’s account is in fact directly contradicted by Moser’s own communique. According to Moser, it was a “Chinese governor” who expressed the wish to “regain complete sovereignty” over the Railway, but needed men and money to do so.

He wished my advice. I refused to suggest the possibility of American cooperation and assistance for which he seemed to be fishing, and he left me with the impression that he was unsatisfied and would call again. Chinese attitude in this matter surprising, unless instigated by Japan.

Why, then, did Li present this as an American proposal? A fluent Russian speaker, Li was no stranger to the Railway zone or to diplomacy. His experience in Harbin dated back to the 1911 Revolution and he had fulfilled consular functions in Vladivostok. Li was probably representing Jilin Governor Guo Zongxi, as Moser’s telegram suggests. Both men may have been trying to coax Beijing into a more assertive stance on the Railway; Guo had been appointed President of the Railway Board in December 1917 and this would have helped consolidate his authority.  At a time when America’s moral authority still held sway in China – and before the rise of the May 4th Movement less than a year later – using Moser as a mouthpiece must have seemed the most persuasive choice.

The Revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion

Throughout spring 1918, resistance to the bolsheviks was endemic in East Siberia, the Russian Far East and Manchuria. Semenov’s military insurgency continued in Transbaikalia, despite Chinese attempts to restrain him. In Harbin, a White government-in-exile coalesced around the Chinese Eastern Railway management, helmed by Horvath, Pleshkov and Kolchak, with the active support of Ambassador Kudashev in Beijing. Diplomatic and material assistance was forthcoming from Britain, France and especially Japan.

Nevertheless, such efforts enjoyed only limited success until the end of May, when the 40,000-strong Czechoslovak Legion – en route to the western front via Vladivostok – rose in revolt. A dispute between legionnaires and Hungarian POWs at the Cheliabinsk station had been mishandled by the soviet authorities in Moscow. Trotsky ordered that the Czechoslovaks be ejected from their trains and disarmed; any armed legionnaire found on the railway was to be “shot on the spot”. Determined to continue their journey to Vladivostok with their weapons intact, the Legion swiftly seized control of the Trans-Siberian railway from Samara to Irkutsk and opened a new front in the Civil War.

Czechoslovak legionnaires in the armoured train Orlik. Source.

Even before the uprising, there were 14,000 legionnaires in Vladivostok awaiting evacuation. By late June they had gained control over the city. Consul Shao Hengjun described the convoluted negotiations that surrounded their takeover.

日內赤哈軍規定陣地軍令，以防崴亂。本日會議，因悉下烏金斯克至薩馬拉諸線，全在赤哈軍手，俄舊黨正思利用，組織西比利亞政府。惟伊爾庫次科在德人掌握，由伊至崴諸橋，均由新黨埋置地雷，武裝俘虜逾三萬，情狀亦至險惡。德人在莫斯科迫使新黨解除赤哈軍裝，或殲除，赤哈甚急，昨有赤軍官偕美員來，西路之赤哈軍，因以求援於在崴之赤哈軍。今早赤哈向英、日二領事求助。午后協約各領事因與哈軍官密議，並招日商備資詢。該軍官等歷述德人雄心，及赤哈被扼，與俄新黨劣狀，願出死力抵敵，將圖西援，驅除俄新黨。惟兵力約須十萬，深慮不給，且軍械不敷甚巨，懇協約各國援助。並稱法國曾允歐戰和議時，必聯合各國，使其獨立云云。各領事均表贊同，允各電請政府維持。所求接濟過山礮三，機關槍百，快槍三千，子彈百萬，議由日本定購，因與日商協議，此其大概。又赤哈軍所據地段，不患無糧，俄黨則否。英領事昨接北京電謂，滿洲裡及邊卡，均弛糧禁，質諸恆浚，答以未經奉京電。赤軍官均甚注。美領事謂現狀遽變，正當緊急，與前時不同，恰須遏運困敵，豈可弛禁。故已電達英使，轉商重禁。以上系會議大略。恆浚早窺赤哈地位已同協約，列邦必有用意，前后曾經電陳，今益瞭然。御德結果不可知，俄新黨似無長久理。冒昧謹聞。

In a few days the Czech troops will issue directives on their military positions, so as to prevent disorder in Vladivostok. Today’s meeting made it known that the entire line from Nizhneudinsk to Samara is wholly in the hands of Czech forces; the Whites are planning to use this to organise a Siberian government. However, Irkutsk is under German control and all the bridges from Irkutsk to Vladivostok have been mined by the bolsheviks. With more than 30,000 armed POWs, the situation is ominous. The Germans in Moscow have forced the bolsheviks to disarm the Czechs, or they would be eliminated. The Czechs are under extreme duress. Yesterday, a Czech officer came with an American representative; the Czech forces on the western part of the line have asked for aid from the Czech troops in Vladivostok.

Legionnaires on the Europe-Asia border. Source.

This morning the Czechs sought help from the British and Japanese consuls. In the afternoon the Allied consuls held a secret meeting with Czech officers and entrusted Japanese merchants with preparing funds. The officers spoke of the Germans’ ambitions, the seizure of Czechoslovakia and their conflict with the bolsheviks. They were willing to resist the enemy to the death, planning to help those in the west and to drive out the bolsheviks. However, this would require a force of around 100,000, which they feared they could not muster. Moreover there is a great shortfall in weaponry, for which Allied aid was earnestly sought. They also said that France had previously agreed that, at the postwar peace talks, it would join with other countries to grant them independence. The consuls all expressed their approval and agreed to wire their governments to support them. The aid they are seeking includes three moutain guns, 100 machine guns, 3,000 rifles, one million bullets. It was resolved that Japan would place orders for these, hence there will be an agreement with Japanese merchants. This was the gist of it. Also, the territories occupied by the Czechs do not suffer from food shortages, unlike those under the bolsheviks.

The British consul received a telegram from Beijing yesterday saying that, at Manzhouli and other border checkpoints, the grain embargo had been entirely lifted. He questioned me about it and I replied that I had not received any wire from Beijing. The Czech officers also paid great attention to this. The American consul said that the situation had changed abruptly. It was now critical, unlike before; at this moment one must cut off supplies to undermine the enemy, so how could the embargo be lifted. Hence, they have wired the British ambassador to negotiate a re-establishment of the embargo.

The above is a summary of the meeting. I had already discerned that the Czechs’ position is the same as that of the Allies, and the Powers have intentions for them. This was mentioned in successive telegrams and now it is all the more clear. As for resistance to the Germans, the outcome of this cannot be known, but it seems that the bolsheviks will not last long. Such is my humble report.

Telegram from Shao Hengjun, 26 June 1918 (sent 25 June). Zhong-e guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919): chubing Xiboliya, p. 195.

“On the shore of the Sea of Japan, 1980”. The last Czechoslovak soldier waits to return home. Cartoon from 1919, Source.

The meeting glossed over some of the intrigues surrounding the Legion in the highly-charged atmosphere of summer 1918. Trotsky’s overreaction to the Cheliabinsk incident was not the result of German pressure, although this seems to have been widely believed within the Legion. Neither was the Allied attitude to the Legion entirely united or even clear before the revolt. The French were eager for the Czechoslovaks to be deployed on the western front, whereas the British – who alone possessed the maritime capabilities to transport them – preferred that they be used in Russia. Their compromise solution, to split the Legion between Archangel and Vladivostok, had been arrived at without consulting the Czechslovaks themselves. Within the French camp, opinion was initially divided as to whether the Legion should resist disarmament or ease their path to Vladivostok by appeasing the soviet authorities. Even the appeal to resume the Manchurian grain embargo, which had so irritated the Chinese, was eventually overruled.

At this point, therefore, Shao could not have grasped the full intricacies of the revolt. Neither does it seem that the Beijing government ever became aware of the schemes surrounding the Legion. Nevertheless, his report correctly concluded that the Legion’s activities would have a significant impact on Allied diplomatic policy. They furnished the opportunity for a more assertive approach to the Russian Civil War, serving as justification for American military involvement in Siberia. Perhaps more threatening from the Chinese point of view was the pre-eminent position taken by Japan, held in check until this point by American opposition. The delicate balancing act between China’s obligations to the Allies and its fears of Japanese expansion would only grow more acute as the prospect of armed intervention drew nearer.