Partisans on the Amur

The stretch of the Amur River around Blagoveshchensk had been one of the Reds’ last holdouts. When White and Japanese forces captured the city in September 1918, they put an end to six months of Soviet rule that had devastated a once-bustling provincial capital. Ataman I.M. Gamov, who had fled to China in March 1918 after a failed uprising against the Soviets, returned to Blagoveshchensk triumphant. Yet the Amur region soon became a hotbed of partisan activity. Bloody attacks against the Whites and the Japanese escalated throughout the early months of 1919, with the involvement of seasoned Bolshevik F.N. Mukhin. These were met with punitive detachments that arbitrarily executed suspected Reds, further antagonising the local population.

Chinese officials watched the cycle of violence from across the Amur with increasing concern. Already in early February, Heihe circuit intendant He Shouren spoke of Japanese and White atrocities in Il’inovka; the villagers appealed to the Chinese for help and resolved to resist further raids with violence. The situation had deteriorated so severely by the middle of the month that Heilongjiang military governor Bao Guiqing sounded a note of alarm.

Japanese soldiers shelling the village of Ivanovka, March 1919. Source.

前接黑河巴司令文電稱：

「接日本副領事阪東通告，奇克特太平溝對岸俄境，集有激黨四百余名，駐伯力日軍高橋聯隊長已在俄岸擦比塔了南方一百八十裡地點交兵。駐河日軍於冬日赴俄境諾肯齊下游米海諾夫辨卡亞地方迎頭堵擊等語。除派隊馳往奇克特、烏雲、寶興一帶會同各防嚴加堵御，並授以機宜，如激黨潰散我岸，能相機解除武裝送部處置更善，倘敢反抗，即行攻擊外，應請電飭第二混成團駐蘿北各防一律堵截」等情。

當經電復，並飭駐蘿防軍嚴行防堵，勿令竄入，如激黨潰散我岸，應即解除武裝，倘敢反抗，即以武力對待去后。茲復接巴司令、何道尹寒電稱：

「昨派翻譯譚咸慶過江，調查起事原因，並証以各方面所聞，大概前政黨敗避我岸，圖謀恢復，時勾結各屯響應，各屯以既在激黨勢力范圍，未敢輕舉，因之飲恨。及政黨克復阿省，不思收拾人心，反借日軍勢力，輒指為亂黨，肆行殺掠，激成公憤，殘余亂黨從而煽惑，遂致於此，並有十七屯民變之風傳。今午司令晤俄領，亦以阿省軍隊附和日軍，辦理不善為恨事。正擬會報間，適阿省華僑報稱，阿省全境過激派頗有死灰復燃之勢，現在已有動機，昨晚阿城險象岌岌，兵營乘機縱火，日軍與舊黨嚴為戒備，幸免其禍，已飭各團營嚴密戒備」等語。

除電復並分飭沿邊軍隊加意防范，隨時探報暨分電外，謹聞。

A wire was received from Heihe commander Ba [Ying’e] on 12 February, saying:

‘According to a notice from Japanese vice-consul Bando, more than 400 Reds have gathered on the Russian side of the river opposite Qikete [today Qike zhen] and Taipinggou. Regimental commander Takahashi of the Japanese troops stationed in Khabarovsk has already fought them at a location 180 li south of Cabitale[?] on the Russian bank. The Japanese troops at Heihe left for Mikhailovka, downriver from Innokent’evka, on 2 February to head them off. I have rapidly deployed troops to the Qikete, Wuyun and Baoxing area to shore up defences together with the border guards. Guidelines have also been issued that, if the Reds are defeated and flee towards our bank, it would be best if they could be disarmed and sent to the headquarters to be dealt with. If they dare to resist, they should be immediately attacked. At the same time, I request that the sentries of the 2nd Mixed Regiment in Luobei be instructed to block them off as well.’

I wired a reply and instructed the Luobei sentries to be on strict guard and block [the Reds], not allowing any of them to slip in. If the Reds are defeated and flee towards our bank, they should be immediately disarmed. If they dare to resist, they should be dealt with immediately by force of arms. Now a wire of 14 February has been received from commander Ba and circuit intendant He, which said:

‘Yesterday, translator Tan Xianqing was dispatched across the river to investigate the causes of the unrest. Based on what was heard from various sources, it seems that when the former governing party was defeated and fled to our bank, they planned a revival and frequently colluded with several villages to rise up in support. Since the villages were within the Red sphere of influence, they did not dare to act rashly. Hence [the party] nursed a grievance against them. When the governing party returned to Amur oblast’, they did not think of winning over the people, instead relying on the power of the Japanese army. They arbitrarily accused people of being Reds, murdering and looting at will and inciting popular anger. The remaining Reds could then agitate among them, which has led to this. There is also a rumour of a popular uprising in 17 villages. This afternoon, the commander [Ba] met with the Russian consul and said it was regrettable that the troops in Amur oblast’ were in league with the Japanese and had managed things poorly. Just as we were about to make this report, Chinese migrants in Amur oblast’ reported that the Reds in the whole of the province were showing strong signs of a resurgence and have already begun to act. Last night, Blagoveshchensk was in a state of alarm and soldiers in the barracks took the opportunity to commit arson. Japanese troops and the Whites were on high alert and thankfully a disaster was avoided. The various units have been instructed to be on strict guard.’

I have wired a response and instructed border troops to pay close attention to defence, as well as report on information gathered.

Telegram from Bao Guiqing, 22 February 1919 (sent 16 February), in Yujun Wang, Tingyi Guo and Qiuyuan Hu (eds.) Zhong-E Guanxi Shiliao: E Zhengbian yu Yiban Jiaoshe (2), Minguo Liunian zhi Banian (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, 1960), p. 64.

Tanabe Waichi (left), member of a Japanese gunboat crew that took part in anti-partisan activities on the Amur River. Source.

Bao’s report highlighted how White misgovernment and the behaviour of the Japanese army had so alienated the population that the countryside was on the brink of revolt. Of particular note, however, is that Chinese concerns about the partisan movement centred on mobile populations. The growing violence in Amur oblast’ would send refugees and Reds fleeing into China, just as Gamov and the Whites had. It also directly threatened the region’s sizeable Chinese diaspora. This latter point was emphasised by the migrants’ own advocacy, channelled through the newly-formed Amur Oblast’ Diaspora Association.

續據黑河巧、效電稱，伊萬諾夫屯聚黨萬余，條晚與舊黨及日軍劇戰，雙方傷亡六七十人，又過激黨勝利，日軍傷亡百余，陣亡堀大隊長一員，鄉民愈聚愈眾，阿省可危。並據華僑總會報稱，該屯華僑分會長會員均退回阿，惟僑民及財產甚多，無法搬運，已請俄省長及日領知照前敵保護。又稱黑河逼近俄岸，如難民來黑，如何應付，乞示機宜等情。

查俄民逃來避難，恐夾有激黨，致俄舊黨及日軍借端搜索，轉為主權邊境有妨，當飭設法阻止。除電復辦外，是否有當，仍乞查照號電各節，一並核示飭遵為盼。

Further telegrams of 18 and 19 February from Heihe state that more than 10,000 Reds have gathered in Ivanovka village. On the night of the 17th, they did battle with the Whites and Japanese troops, 60-70 were killed or wounded on both sides. The Reds were victorious, more than 100 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded. Battalion commander Hori was killed in action. The villagers are gathering in ever greater numbers and Amur oblast’ is in danger. Also, according to a report from the Chinese diaspora association, the leader and members of its branch in that village have all retreated to Blagoveshchensk. However, the migrants and their property are very numerous there and they cannot move. The Russian governor and Japanese consul have been requested to inform the [troops at the] front to protect them. The report also said that Heihe is close to the Russian bank and asked for guidelines on what to do if refugees arrived.

If Russians flee here to escape the disorder, I fear that there may be Reds among them, which would give the Whites and Japanese troops a pretext to conduct searches. This would then undermine sovereignty and the border situation. I have instructed that they should be stopped. A response has been wired to implement this. As for whether this is appropriate, I earnestly seek your instructions on the matter together with the various items in the telegram of the 20th.

Telegram from Bao Guiqing, 22 February 1919 (sent 21 February). Ibid., pp. 64-65.

Mukhin in custody (centre) among White and Japanese troops, March 1919. Source.

Chinese border officials thus recommended the same approach towards all escapee Russians, be they Reds or Whites. Both were threats to border security. They should be prevented from entering Chinese territory or, failing which, should be disarmed beforehand. Where the Whites differed from the Reds was in their treatment of the Chinese diaspora and their collusion with the Japanese army. Bao was already well aware of the mistreatment of Chinese migrants by Semenov; now it seemed that the Whites in Amur oblast’ were just as ruthless.

The disturbances along the Amur culminated in the Ivanovka Incident of 22 March, when White and Japanese forces decimated the village following an abortive partisan attack on Blagoveshchensk. Just as the diaspora association had warned, several Chinese were among the 257 casualties. This cemented the Whites’ reputation for anti-Chinese brutality at a time when the Red Terror and War Communism had not yet made inroads into the Russian Far East. Although the Reds were ideological extremists and harbingers of revolution, the Whites now seemed no better. The Whites’ callousness antagonised Russian villagers and Chinese officials alike – a mistake that would haunt them as the movement collapsed in winter 1919.

The Inter-Allied Railway Commission

By the beginning of 1919, the Allied intervention in Siberia faced a new set of possibilities and problems. The anti-Bolshevik movement had begun to coalesce around Kolchak’s government in Omsk, which busied itself with mustering an army to take on the Reds. But the success of the war effort – to say nothing of the Allied forces themselves – was highly dependent on the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern railways. Transport on these railways had long been in a chaotic state. In September 1917, Kerensky had requested American assistance to put the Trans-Siberian in order. America’s Russian Railway Service Corps, led by John F. Stevens, arrived too late to assist the Provisional Government. Thereafter the November Revolution, Civil War, and infighting between Kolchak and Semenov only rendered the situation worse.

Some members of the Russian Railway Service Corps in Nagasaki, where they had gone after the November Revolution. April 1918. Source.

The situation on the Chinese Eastern Railway was somewhat different. Unable to work on the Trans-Siberian at first, the Russian Railway Service Corps shifted its focus to the CER in March 1918, where it promptly set about attempting to improve transport. Besides dealing with anti-Bolshevik intrigues in the CER zone, however, the Corps had to contend with the ongoing rivalry between China, Russia and Japan over the Railway. With the advent of the Siberian Intervention, Japanese troops were deployed along the CER zone in accordance with the Sino-Japanese Joint Defence Agreement and had begun interfering in railway affairs. For its part, China considered Russian domination of the zone to be an erosion of its territorial sovereignty. It had succeeded in expelling the Russian railway guard in the winter of 1917-1918 and in appointing a Chinese president to the CER administration. Both Beijing and the Manchurian authorities alike were keen to preserve this hard-won victory. Yet continued mismanagement of the CER put Chinese and Japanese interests on a collison course with America’s desire to reform the railways.

The Americans had already begun to draw up a rescue plan for the CER in August 1918. At the time, they approached Chinese ambassador Wellington Koo and Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang to sound out Beijing’s attitude to Allied supervision of the Railway. Beijing rejected this as an infringement of its rights on the CER, and it seems that no further information was received until a telegram suddenly arrived from Vladivostok three months later.

顷接探悉，日、美、英、法以俄国路政不修，运输阻滞，拟共同监管西比利、阿穆尔、乌苏里等铁路，由外交方面在东京协议。美欲操主管权，而日本欲充会长，并要求派日技师与美并立，意见各执。英[疑为衍字]法赞同美议。英心亦谓然，惟碍于日议，未便断言。大体奇异，一再会商，尚无结果。东省铁路恐亦在协商之列。惟此路在俄国不能维持时，应由中国管理，他国越俎，虽不肯认许，如果必不得已，再为筹商共同监管，亦须我为领袖，以杜争攘，而保主权。当否乞裁。再东京会议，应请章公使密探详情。

I have just received information that Japan, America, Britain and France – due to the Russian railway administration’s lack of reform and blockages in transport – propose to jointly supervise the Siberian, Amur and Ussuri railways. The diplomats in Tokyo are to reach an agreement. America wishes to exercise managerial authority, while Japan wishes to serve as the chairman and has requested to send Japanese technicians alongside American ones. Both sides are holding to their own opinions. France approves of the American proposal. The British are also inclined to agree, but they are hindered by the Japanese proposal and find it inexpedient to assert themselves. They are all at odds and after repeated discussions, there is still no result. One fears that the Chinese Eastern Railway is also included in the talks. However, at times when this Railway cannot be maintained by Russia, it should be managed by China. Although other countries cannot be permitted to usurp this position, if there is no choice and joint supervision is discussed again, China should also be the leader, in order to prevent competition and preserve sovereignty. As for whether this is appropriate, I seek your counsel. Regarding the Tokyo talks, Ambassador Zhang [Zongxiang] should be asked to make discreet enquiries.

Telegram from Liu Jingren, 12 January 1919 (sent 11 January), in Li Guoqi, Guo Tingyi and Hu Qiuyuan (eds.), Zhong-E guanxi shiliao: Zhongdong tielu (1), Minguo liunian zhi banian (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1983), p. 255.

Corps dispatcher Fayette W. Keeler with Japanese soldiers in Kuanchengzi, 1919. Source.

Liu was the former ambassador to Russia and now served as China’s envoy to the Allied interventionary headquarters in Vladivostok. His telegram mirrored other news coming from Harbin and the Chinese embassies in Washington and Tokyo. It sent shockwaves through Beijing and Manchuria, especially since Chinese enquiries about inter-Allied supervision had been denied in December. Why was China not informed of the Tokyo negotiations, given that the CER was in Chinese territory and the Chinese government was a co-owner? How would an inter-Allied agreement safeguard Chinese sovereignty? Exactly what would Japan’s role be, especially in the critical area of guarding the Railway? The Beijing Foreign Ministry instructed its diplomats to inform the Americans and Japanese that the CER was a joint Sino-Russian enterprise and could not be lumped in with other Russian railways. China should have a leading role in deciding how it should be managed. CER president Guo Zongxi went one step further, suggesting that China lodge a protest at the Paris Peace Conference.

America’s response to Chinese protests was firm. The proposal of inter-Allied supervision was made in order to limit Japanese influence on the CER, precisely with China’s interests in mind. If China were to take over sole management of the Railway, it would only facilitate further Japanese expansion. Besides, Britain and France had not been part of the negotiations in Tokyo, so China could not claim to have been snubbed. This struck the necessary chord: Chinese officialdom was well aware of the tensions between America and Japan in the Far East, and understood that one could be played off the other. A desire to preserve the balance of power in Manchuria eventually informed China’s decision to support inter-Allied supervision of the CER in mid-February.

Engineer John Frank Stevens, head of the Inter-Allied Technical Board, in 1917. Source.

Yet the Chinese continued to be suspicious. Despite America’s professions of goodwill, its exclusion of China from the initial, decisive railway negotiations continued to rankle. Four days after Liu sent his telegram, Japan and America officially reached an agreement on inter-Allied supervision in Tokyo, with the details to be worked out in a subsequent meeting in Vladivostok. But this capped off months of discussions between both countries, of which Chinese officials were only dimly aware. The text of the 15 January agreement, moreover, was only conveyed by the Japanese government to ambassador Zhang Zongxiang two weeks later; Liu also managed to obtain a copy then, although he did not specify how in his correspondence with the Foreign Ministry. Official notice of the substance of the Tokyo agreement was only given on 17 February, when the American and Japanese ambassadors presented it to Beijing. Finally, as Liu’s wire pointed out, the Chinese could hardly believe that the British and French had been kept in the dark. It seemed that China alone had been singled out as a junior partner among the Allies.

The Inter-Allied Railway Commission for the Supervision of the Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways was inaugurated in March 1919. Liu became the Commission’s Chinese member, together with representatives from America, Japan, Russia, Britain, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia. Yale-educated engineer Zhan Tianyou, the “Father of China’s Railroads”, joined the Technical Board headed by Stevens. Throughout the three years of its existence, the Commission allowed the Chinese to continue guarding the CER and maintained a policy of non-interference in local politics. It also served to keep the Japanese in check, just as both China and America had hoped. Nevertheless, the commission was rather less successful in reining in the excesses of White warlords, who proved immune to diplomatic pressure or political suasion. Their depredations would last beyond the fall of the Omsk regime – and until the Chinese takeover of the CER zone in 1920.

A Warlord’s New Year Predictions

There was much for Manchurian officialdom to take stock of in the closing days of 1918. In January, the impact of the November Revolution in Harbin allowed Chinese troops to evict the Chinese Eastern Railway’s Russian guard and chip away at Horvath’s authority in the CER zone. As the Bolsheviks swept eastwards and Japanese interference seemed imminent, Beijing and Tokyo signed a fateful Joint Defence Agreement that granted the latter sweeping powers in wartime. Cossack warlord Semenov established himself at Manzhouli, provoking a border insurgency that lasted throughout the spring and summer. Finally, the revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion swiftly undermined Red power and touched off the large-scale, international Siberian Intervention. Anti-Bolshevik governments sprang up in China as well as Russia, although unity among these various regimes was by no means assured.

In late-December 1918, therefore, Heilongjiang military governor Bao Guiqing sent the Foreign Ministry a lengthy wire setting out his assessment of the far eastern situation, part of which is excerpted below. Weighing on his mind was the recent conflict between Semenov and Kolchak’s All-Russian government, but mostly because it was an avatar of the more longstanding rivalry between America and Japan.

“Dogs of the Entente: Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich”. Viktor Deni, c. 1919. Source.

據中東鐵路線內博、昂兩站駐軍報告，霍、謝衝突，互扣軍用車輛等情，業於刪電陳報在案。

查謝米諾夫欲在西伯利亞東部建設獨立政府，蓄志已久，非自今日。日本即利用此點，陰助其成，以謀攫西伯利亞權利。美國亦竊破此點，欲扶助俄人，俾建統一政府，以排斥此陰謀，而維持遠東新均勢之局。謝氏既宣言反對全俄政府，該政府首領闊洛查克則聯絡霍爾瓦特，任命為貝加爾、黑龍洲、阿穆爾、沿海洲四省總督，以分割謝之勢力。近據諜報，全俄政府擬派富爾郭夫將軍率兵東進，以壓迫謝軍，霍又任命，亦傾向該政府，擬調兵向滿洲裡西進，以圖謝氏之后，此霍、謝衝突之由來也。

惟此時日本經營西伯利亞已有基礎，非竭力保全謝氏，則不能遂其大欲。聞其原駐齊都之第三師，將調集於伊爾庫斯克方面，扼制闊氏之討謝軍。一面以原駐滿洲裡之第七師，布置中東鐵路沿線后防，不使為霍所乘，危及謝氏。其宗旨無非使謝得乘間鞏固東部地盤，彼得擴充權利，實行其遠東之大陸政策。但據聞闊氏之聲言討謝，實由美國暗中主持，彼闊、霍與謝氏之爭，即為日、美相爭之導火線。蓋美、日暗潮醞釀甚久，如果愈演愈烈，一旦爆發，必成燎原。然美國聲望甚高，今方主盟壇坫，執世界之牛耳，日本當不敢冒大不韙，輕犯其鋒，惟又不甘舍棄其巨大之權利。逆揣此時計劃，表面必不與美顯然衝突，且將聲言不干涉俄國內爭，願以友邦好意，居於調人地位，故今日調和霍、謝之聲浪，實有由來。一則彼雖欲扶助謝氏，亦知謝資望較淺不足孚眾心，兼籠絡霍氏，使與謝連和，則彼之策劃始克告成功。一則彼如顯示袒謝，不獨開舋於美，且無以避協商國之責言，計惟有操縱於霍、謝之間，並勸令謝氏與全俄政府協和，俾謝得保守東部地位，然后可貫澈其攫取權利之目的。惟日人此項計劃，儻為美所竊破，主使闊氏政府決意實行討伐，則最后一步日、美之衝突，終至不能避免，而以兵戎相見，將來遠東再演甲寅日俄戰爭之禍，殆可預言。中國於此，惟有援甲寅先例，嚴守中立。所最堪慮者，日人如借口共同防敵之約，脅迫我國牽入漩渦，應之則勢有不能，不應則禍在眉睫，實為我國生死關頭最困難之問題。是以默未來情勢，不可不有預定之方針。竊謂吾國此時當先聯絡英、法，取同一之態度，若得其默加援助，則至萬不得已時，英、法首先認我中立，美必認之，日本亦不能不認之，更借協商國助力，詳定條件，劃定中立區域，則大局可保，而東省戰禍庶幾其可少紓。

The troops stationed at Boketu and Ang’angxi on the Chinese Eastern Railway have reported on the clash between Horvath and Semenov and their mutual confiscation of military trains. This was conveyed in the telegram of the 15th.

Semenov has long harboured the desire to establish an independent government in the eastern part of Siberia; this did not emerge only today. Japan is thus using this, secretly aiding his success in order to seize economic privileges in Siberia. America has also seen through this and wishes to support the Russians in establishing a unified government, to thwart this scheme and maintain the new balance of power in the far east. Since Semenov announced his opposition to the All-Russian government, its leader, Kolchak, contacted Horvath and appointed him governor-general of the four provinces of Baikal, Heilongzhou [sic, probably Amur], Amur and Primor’e, thus cutting back Semenov’s influence. Recently, according to intelligence reports, the All-Russian government plans to send General [V.I.] Volkov to lead troops eastwards and suppress Semenov’s forces. Horvath has accepted his post and is inclined towards that government, planning to send troops westwards to Manzhouli to attack Semenov’s rear. Such are the origins of the Horvath-Semenov conflict.

At this time, however, Japan has gained a foothold for its operations in Siberia. Without doing its outmost to protect Semenov, it cannot achieve its wider goals. It is said that their 3rd Division, originally stationed in Chita, will be moved to the Irkutsk area to head off Kolchak’s forces which are coming to punish Semenov. Similarly, the 7th Division stationed at Manzhouli will be distributed along the Chinese Eastern Railway line as a rearguard, such that Horvath will not have an opportunity to endanger Semenov. Its aim is none other than to give Semenov the space to consolidate his eastern fiefdom, whereupon it will be able to increase its economic privileges and realise its policy towards the far eastern mainland. But one hears that Kolchak’s pronouncements about suppressing Semenov are in fact secretly orchestrated by America. The fight between Kolchak, Horvath and Semenov is thus the forerunner of a conflict between Japan and America. After all, the undercurrents between America and Japan have been developing for a long time. If they grow even more acute, once an explosion occurs there will be a massive conflagration.

Japanese soldier with homing pigeons. Source.

However, America’s prestige is very great. It will now preside over the Allied conference, leading the world’s diplomacy [Bao’s choice of words refers to a meeting of lords, dating back to the Spring and Autumn period, at which alliances are concluded]. Of course, Japan will not dare to risk the world’s opprobrium and pick a fight lightly, but at the same time it cannot bear to forfeit its extensive economic privileges. I predict that its current plan must be, superficially, not to openly clash with America, and to declare that it will not interfere in Russia’s internal conflict; that, out of neighbourly relations and goodwill, it wishes to as act a mediator. Hence today, there is indeed talk of mediating between Horvath and Semenov. On one level, although it wishes to support Semenov, it also knows that his reputation is relatively poor and insufficient to win the people’s confidence. Thus it must curry favour with Horvath at the same time and induce him to join forces with Semenov. Only then will it be able to carry out its plans. On another level, if it openly favours Semenov, not only will this be tantamount to starting a fight with America, it also cannot avoid blame from the Allies. Only by manoeuvring between Horvath and Semenov, and advising Semenov to come to terms with the All-Russian government, can it enable Semenov to preserve his position in the east, thereafter allowing it to completely realise its aim of seizing economic privileges.

Yet if Japan’s plan is seen through by America, and America incites the Kolchak government to resolutely carry out the punitive expedition, the final clash between Japan and America will be unavoidable. If they take military action against each other, then the Far East will see a repeat of the disaster of the 1914 [sic] Russo-Japanese War. This can almost be predicted. At this time, China can only use 1914 [sic] as a precedent and maintain strict neutrality. What is most worrying is that Japan may use the Joint Defence Agreement as a pretext to force us into this quagmire. We do not have the strength to comply, yet if we do not comply the disaster will be imminent. Indeed, at that life-or-death moment, this will be the most critical question for us. Hence, with these future trends in mind, we cannot but determine an approach in advance. Now, our country should first communicate with Britain and France, and align our attitudes. If we can obtain their tacit support, during a moment of crisis Britain and France will take the lead in recognising our neutrality. America must also recognise it and Japan cannot but follow suit. Further, with Allied support, detailed articles should be drawn up delimiting the areas of neutrality. Then may the situation as a whole be preserved, and the tragedy of war in Manchuria may hopefully be averted.

Telegram from Bao Guiqing, 28 December 1918 (sent 22 December). Zhong-E guanxi shiliao Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919). E zhengbian yu yiban jiaoshe (1), pp. 612-613.

Bao Guiqing, ally of Zhang Zuolin. Source.

This was not the first time Bao had weighed in on the Russian Civil War. Although a member of Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian clique and thus a reviled “warlord”, he has been considered one of Manchuria’s more able leaders, especially in terms of rolling back Russian influence. As early as February 1918, Bao had already drawn up a five-point defence plan to deal with a potential Bolshevik onslaught, and he continued to convey detailed reports and proposals to Beijing throughout the year. The telegram above showed his keen awareness of events, both historical and current; their import in the wider clash between the Great Powers; and the value of diplomatic and legal niceties, as in the discussion on neutrality.

Bao’s predictions were in fact fairly prescient, if somewhat premature. Allied pressure did indeed get Japan to adopt a more conciliatory approach towards Kolchak, accept joint control over the CER and scale back some of its forces. Semenov duly agreed to recognise Kolchak on a provisional basis, although he never contributed troops to Omsk and continued to disrupt railway traffic. What did not materialise was the showdown between America and Japan. When Bao sent his missive, the Japanese could still be persuaded by Allied arm-twisting. They had not yet been disappointed over the Racial Equality Proposal during the Paris Peace Conference, or snubbed with the tonnage ratios in the Washington Naval Treaty. It would take another two decades for Japanese militarism and disillusionment with the Western Powers to trigger the “explosion” that would lead to the “massive conflagration” of a new World War.

Semenov vs. Kolchak

Towards the winter of 1918, Siberia’s fragmented anti-Bolshevik movement showed some signs of consolidation. The Provisional All-Russian Government in Omsk had succeeded in absorbing the Komuch regime in Samara, as well as the Derber and Horvath cabinets in Vladivostok. Allied representatives began to converge on Omsk just as its politics shifted rightwards. A military dictatorship – rather than a broad coalition of Siberian regionalists, socialists and liberals – was increasingly seen as the only way to defeat Bolshevism.

Admiral A.V. Kolchak soon emerged as a potential dictator. Although his previous involvement with the Whites in Beijing and Harbin had ended in failure, the momentum in Omsk brought him out of exile in Japan. Arriving in Vladivostok in September, he met with Vologodskii, leader of the Omsk government, and Gajda, commander of the Czechoslovak Legion. Kolchak proved congenial to both, especially since his contacts with the Allies were crucial for future material and diplomatic aid. He joined the Vologodskii cabinet in October and, on 18 November, a coup brought him to power as Supreme Ruler.

Within a week, however, Ataman Semenov – cossack warlord of the Special Manchurian Detachment, who had established himself in Chita – openly refused to subordinate himself to Kolchak. It touched off a struggle over the Chinese Eastern Railway between Semenov and the Japanese on one side, and Horvath as Omsk’s agent on the other. For his part, Kolchak stripped Semenov of his position and declared him a traitor. Chinese authorities across the border warned of an imminent clash; of particular concern was Semenov’s reliance on the Japanese, who encouraged the conflict.

Portrait of Admiral Kolchak, 1919. Source.

據駐崴聯絡員王興文侵電稱，據聞謝米諾夫與闊爾恰克起訌，系受日人蠱惑，將使西比利亞再陷紛亂。又霍爾瓦特之軍用專車，由崴西進至博克圖，被日人扣留，意在阻止霍軍之征討謝軍。又准黑龍江鮑督軍文電稱，謝氏反對闊爾恰克，勢將決裂，霍氏擬出師討伐，日軍第七師分令沿途駐軍嚴查霍軍到站人數及其行動，如果謝、霍以兵戎相見，本省適當其衝，而日人希收漁利，應付尤難，應請迅示機宜。又准中東路郭督辦寒電稱，俄國威代辦因謝軍拘捕管理該路輸運之俄員，來請華軍保護，當經分電鮑、孟二督軍，迅飭沿線各軍一體嚴防，加意保護。惟查我國現時對俄意向，應與協約國多數一致，據各方報告，日人利用謝氏暗圖擾亂，其他協約國則多數袒護闊爾恰克之全俄政府，日前俄報並有各國擬承認闊政府之說。究竟協約各國對於闊政府意見如何，祈即探詢各駐使，並電崴埠劉使查明見告。又准鮑督軍刪電稱，日軍扣留霍軍車輛，請我協助，一面拉代辦請我扣留謝軍運品，勸其出境，勿令干涉路務，並保護沿路俄員，現抱定不干涉宗旨，免形偏倚。一面電飭我軍保護路線，維持秩序，以盡責任。請速探明協商各使對俄態度，從速密示各等因到處。

查謝米諾夫反抗闊政府之事，本處疊據庫倫陳大員及駐哈聯絡員王興文先后來電，於本月十二日密函貴部，探明駐京英、美、日、法、義、俄各使對於此案之態度，並請將駐崴高等委員有無此項報告到部，查明並復。一面又分行吉、黑二督軍暨第九師師長飭屬戒備各在案。惟日來邊警頻傳謝與闊、霍衝突之事，不久恐釀成戰禍，我國東北諸省既首當其衝，而鮑督軍、郭督辦及王興文來電又有謝氏為人利用，希圖擾亂西比利亞之說，若不亟行探明英、美、法、義等國對此案之意見，則應付方針遽難確定。究竟外交團方面對謝持何態度，有無如郭督辦據俄報所稱，協約擬承認闊政府之說。又日本扣留征謝霍軍車輛，阻止霍軍征討一事，英、美、法、義等國各駐使對之意見如何，應請貴部檢同前案，迅予分別詳密探明，並復本處，以憑核辦。

According to a telegram of the 12th from Vladivostok liaison officer Wang Xingwen, it is said that Semenov has started a quarrel with Kolchak, being lured into this by the Japanese. It will plunge Siberia into disorder again. Also, Horvath’s troop transports going westwards from Vladivostok were detained by the Japanese on arriving at Boketu, with the intention of preventing Horvath’s forces from launching a punitive expedition against Semenov’s. Moreover, according to a telegram of the 12th from Heilongjiang military governor Bao [Guiqing], Semenov opposes Kolchak and is tending towards a decisive break. Horvath planned to send troops to suppress him, but the Japanese 7th Division instructed the troops along the line to strictly observe the number of Horvath’s troops arriving at each station, as well as their movements. If hostilities break out between Semenov and Horvath, the province [Heilongjiang] would become their battlefield, with the Japanese hoping to reap the rewards of their conflict. The situation is difficult, could advice be given as soon as possible.

And, according to a telegram of the 14th from CER president Guo [Zongxi], because Semenov had been arresting Russian workers in charge of shipping on the Railway, Russian deputy Wei [name unknown] asked Chinese troops to protect them. He has wired the military governors Bao and Meng to quickly instruct the various forces along the line to be on strict guard and pay extra heed to protection. However, our country’s current attitude towards Russia should be in line with that of the Allied majority. According to reports from various sources, the Japanese are using Semenov to cause trouble secretly, whereas the other Allies are mostly inclined towards Kolchak’s All-Russian Government. Some days ago, the Russian newspapers also reported the rumour that other countries are planning to recognise the Kolchak government. As for what the precise Allied attitude is towards the Kolchak government, Guo asked that enquiries be made with the various ambassadors, as well as that ambassador Liu [Jingren] in Vladivostok be wired to find out and report.

Semenov with members of the Special Manchurian Detachment. Source.

Furthermore, according to a telegram of the 15th from military governor Bao, Japanese troops were detaining Horvath’s trains and asked us to assist. On the one hand, deputy [V.D.] Lachinov has asked us to confiscate Semenov’s shipments and advise him to leave the area, such that they may not interfere in railway matters, as well as protect the Russian staff along the line. We are now holding to the principle of non-interference, to avoid any sign of bias. On the other hand, our troops have been instructed to guard the railway and maintain order, so as to fulfil their responsibilities. Bao asked that the attitude of the Allied ambassadors towards Russia be sought and swiftly conveyed.

Regarding the matter of Semenov opposing Kolchak, this Bureau has received multiple telegrams from Kulun superintendent Chen [Yi] as well as liaison officer in Harbin [sic] Wang Xingwen. We wrote to Your Ministry on the 12th of this month, to ascertain the attitudes of the British, American, Japanese, French, Italian and Russian ambassadors towards this matter, and to ask if the plenipotentiary in Vladivostok had sent in any relevant reports. At the same time, we wrote to the military governors of Jilin and Heilongjiang, as well as the commander of the 9th Division, to instruct their subordinates to be on alert. However, recently the border troops have repeatedly conveyed news of Semenov’s clash with Kolchak and Horvath, which will soon result in war, and that all our northeastern provinces will bear the brunt of it. Moreover, the telegrams of military governor Bao, president Guo and Wang Xingwen also say that Semenov is being used by others with the goal of causing trouble in Siberia. If we do not urgently ascertain the opinions of Britain, America, France and Italy towards this, it will be difficult to determine a way to deal with this. What is the attitude of the diplomatic corps towards Semenov, and is there talk of the Allies planning to recognise the Kolchak government, as president Guo says was reported in the Russian newspapers? Also, regarding the matter of the Japanese detaining Horvath’s troop transports against Semenov and blocking their punitive expedition, what is the attitude of the British, American, French and Italian ambassadors? We request that Your Ministry make detailed and discreet enquiries alongside the previous requests, and respond to this Bureau as a basis for further action.

Letter from the War Participation Bureau, 21 December 1918 (sent 19 December). Zhong-E guanxi shiliao Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919). E zhengbian yu yiban jiaoshe (1), pp. 600-601.

Kolchak (seated) with members of the British Military Mission to Siberia, 1919. General Alfred Knox, head of the Mission and longstanding supporter of Kolchak, stands behind him. Source.

The bad blood between both men dated back to Kolchak’s sojourn in China. Semenov’s ties to the Japanese rankled with the Admiral. In May, he had also insulted Kolchak when the latter went to meet him at Manzhouli with funds and to discuss military plans. And although it was a personal vendetta that fuelled the conflict, the might of the Japanese army forestalled any attempt to bring Semenov to heel.

As the War Participation Bureau rightly surmised, therefore, Allied opinion – if not outright recognition – was crucial to settle the conflict. In early December, Kolchak set about campaigning the British, French and Americans to compel the Japanese to cease supporting Semenov. Protests were eventually lodged with Tokyo but, unless the Allies officially recognised the Kolchak government, the Japanese could limit themselves to relatively minor concessions. Over the CER, for example, tensions were partially resolved when an Inter-Allied Railway Committee was set up. But the Imperial Japanese Army persisted in blocking any punitive measures against Semenov. He refused to contribute any units to Kolchak’s army and continued disrupting railway traffic, much to the Committee’s frustration.

Japan’s support for White leaders such as Semenov raised alarm bells among Chinese officials. Yet China lacked the military strength, diplomatic clout and political will to take the Japanese head-on. The War Participation Bureau was itself led by Duan Qirui, who was dependent on Japanese largesse. Like Kolchak, Beijing was obliged to play the Allies off the Japanese, a game that would be all the more complex following the Armistice of November 1918.

A Japanese Team in Xinjiang

In previous posts, we saw how the fateful Sino-Japanese Joint Defence Agreement of May 1918 was activated during the Siberian Intervention. Empowered by the agreement, the Imperial Japanese Army dispatched troops across North Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Railway. They clashed with Chinese forces, who had only just succeeded in ejecting the Russian railway guard and reviving some degree of Chinese control over the CER zone.

Xinjiang was not directly mentioned in the Defence Agreement. Nevertheless, it was also a target of Japanese imperial ambitions and, in October 1918, a nine-man team arrived in Xinjiang on the pretext of implementing the Agreement. Governor Yang Zengxin sounded a note of alarm:

A Chinese New Year procession in Aqsu. From the Mannerheim expedition, c. 1907. Source.

竊自中日密約定后，日本調查員成田哲夫等九員到新來見，所述皆關協防俄德之事，該洋員隨遣其徒分赴塔城、伊犁、喀什等處從事調查。前者，成田哲夫計劃擬在蘭州、肅州一帶屯駐四師團之重兵，又酌分一、二師團集中於迪化，已在甘、涼、肅、迪之間調查，並質及運輸方法。增新以該洋員取陳，未遽指調日本軍隊，或者關心我國西北防務，借著代籌，亦未可知。乃昨據探員密稱：「成田哲夫對於新疆，急欲調遣一師團，一混成旅駐新，以資活動，名義上仍托為防俄防德」云云。是欲調日本軍隊來新明矣。

查中日陸軍共同防敵軍事已協定，在政府實迫於不獲己，究竟秘約所訂定第一條：中日兩國陸軍因敵國實力之日見蔓延於俄國境內，其結果將使遠東之和平及安寧受侵迫之危險，為適應此項情勢及實行兩國參加此次戰爭之義務，取共同防敵之行動。又說明載，凡日本之關東都督，中國之奉天、吉林、黑龍江各都督公署及在作戰區域內之各軍事機關均應互派參謀充當聯絡職務，此事在作戰開始時行之各等語。約內既揭明遠東、關東、又揭明奉天、吉林、黑龍江是公同防敵之范圍，同以東三省為限步。成田哲夫欲托為防德防俄，請調日兵來新，既與該秘約協定之內容不相符合，況新疆之國防中國自能籌之，新疆之官民亦自能籌之，毋庸借助日兵之遠來。

現在日俄開戰，俄新黨在西北利亞已失其勢力，而與新疆接壤之塔什干、安集延、七河省，薩瑪爾一帶沿邊數千裡仍為俄新黨勢力范圍所及。俄國有回民，新疆亦有回民，俄國有纏民，新疆亦有纏民，俄國有哈薩克，新疆亦有哈薩克，俄國有布民，新疆亦有布民。以上各種人民皆系同種同教，然新疆各種人民無外向之心，不致為外人所煽惑者，全系服從中央起見。增新與省議會密商數次，據議會全體代表人民願合新疆各種人民之力維持新疆籌餉籌兵，力任其難，第求中央接濟軍械，新疆人民自能協力籌防。若如成田哲夫所籌，必先調令日本重兵分駐新疆各地，不特惹起敵國特別注意，而人民驚擾，供應浩繁，邊遠窮荒，難堪此苦。若各種人民因而誤會，更必別生枝節，生心外向。新疆情形與東三省不同，未便聽日本派兵遠來喧賓奪主，致貽后患。況日兵調查駐新疆，沿途征發輸送等事，在在與居民有直接關系，或人民因誤會而生阻力，不論如何，結果地方已失其安寧。若因此牽動邊局，新疆東土耳其斯坦回纏與俄屬西土耳其斯坦回纏本屬同種同文，為淵毆魚，不可不防。是則日本人以協防新疆之美意其終久不免陷新疆於危險，中央尤不能不默為注意者也。

除將邊防事宜隨時籌備外，如果日人有因協防俄德問題經向我國政府提議調遣日兵來新疆之舉，務乞嚴詞拒絕，無令得逞，以固邊圉而延國脈，是為萬幸。披瀝密陳，是否有當，無任迫切待命之至。

After the Sino-Japanese secret agreement was settled, Japanese observer Narita Tetsuo and his staff – a total of nine – came to Xinjiang to meet me. They spoke only of joint defence against Russia and Germany. The foreign staff in his entourage would be sent under his direction to Tarbagatai, Ili and Kashgar to carry out surveys [Note: The term 洋員 implies someone of western origin, but the Narita mission was in fact staffed entirely by Japanese – R.L.]. Regarding the former, Narita planned to station four divisions of strong troops in the Lanzhou and Gansu area and considered allocating one or two divisions to be centred on Dihua. Surveys had already been conducted in the areas between Gansu, Liangzhou, Suzhou and Dihua, and a logistics plan drawn up. I considered that the statements from the foreign staff were premature in calling for the deployment of Japanese troops. Perhaps they are so concerned about the defence of our country’s northwest that they are making plans on our behalf, who can tell? But yesterday, according to an agent’s secret report, ‘Narita urgently wishes to deploy a division and a mixed brigade to Xinjiang to aid in his activities, in the name of defence against the Russians and Germans.’ Indeed, it is clear that he wants to send Japanese troops to Xinjiang.

The matter of the Sino-Japanese Joint Defence Agreement has already been concluded. On the government’s side, it absolutely had no choice and was forced into it. After all, the first article in the secret agreement states: In view of the steady spread of enemy influence in Russian territory, with the result that the peace and tranquility of the Far East is in danger of being violated, the Chinese and Japanese armies will undertake joint defensive action in order to meet these circumstances and fulfil the duty of both countries in participating in this war. The explanatory notes state that all Japanese military authorities in Guandong; the Chinese military authorities in Fengtian, Jilin and Heilongjiang; and the various military organisations in the battlefield must appoint attaches for liaison purposes. This will be implemented on the outbreak of hostilities. The agreement specifies the Far East and Guandong – as well as Fengtian, Jilin and Heilongjiang – as the area of joint defence, which is no different from limiting it to Manchuria [Note: The text of the Agreement does not name Guandong or the three Manchurian provinces – R.L.]. Narita wishes to use the excuse of defence against Russia and Germany to request the deployment of Japanese troops in Xinjiang. This is not in keeping with the contents of the secret agreement. Moreover, the defence of Xinjiang can be handled by China itself; the officials and people of Xinjiang can also handle it themselves. There is no need to seek help from Japanese soldiers coming from far away.

The second Otani expedition to Central Asia and Xinjiang, 1908-1909. Source.

Now Japan and Russia are fighting, the Reds have lost their power in Siberia. But in Tashkent, Andijan, Semirech’e and Zharkent, adjacent to Xinjiang, a frontier of several thousand miles is still within the Reds’ sphere of influence. Russia has Hui, Xinjiang also has Hui; Russia has Uyghurs, Xinjiang also has Uyghurs; Russia has Kazakhs, Xinjiang also has Kazakhs; Russia has Kyrgyz, Xinjiang also has Kyrgyz. All these people are of the same race and religion, yet the various nationalities of Xinjiang have not looked outwards and have not been incited by foreigners, all due to their submission to the Centre. I have secretly discussed this with the provincial legislature several times. The entire legislature represented the people in expressing the desire to unite the strength of the various nationalities in Xinjiang to preserve the province and provide both military finances and troops, valiantly shouldering this burden. They then asked the central government to assist with weaponry, whereupon the people of Xinjiang can join forces in defence. If we go with Narita’s scheme, he will first deploy strong Japanese troops, to be stationed throughout Xinjiang. Not only will this draw the attention of enemy countries, the people will also be alarmed and supply will be difficult; the frontier is distant and poor and cannot bear this burden. If, as a result, the various nationalities come to a misunderstanding, further complications will arise and their loyalties will turn elsewhere. Xinjiang’s circumstances are different from those of Manchuria, it cannot allow Japan to bring troops from far away, turning the guest into the host and causing future trouble. Moreover, if Japanese soldiers survey and are stationed in Xinjiang, all matters involving requisitioning and transport will bring them into direct contact with the inhabitants. It may be that the people will resist due to a misunderstanding. In any case, the result will be the disruption of peace in that area. If, due to this, the border situation is affected, the Hui and Uyghurs of Xinjiang-East Turkestan and the Hui and Uyghurs of Russia-West Turkestan are of the same race and language, poor management will lead to unintended consequences and we must prevent this. Indeed, Japan’s good intentions in assisting with Xinjiang’s defence will unavoidably plunge Xinjiang into danger in the end. This is something the central government must heed.

Apart from dealing with border defence matters as they arise, if the Japanese use joint defence against Russia and Germany as a pretext to suggest the deployment of troops to Xinjiang to our government, I ask that you strenuously refuse and prevent them from achieving their goals. This would consolidate the border and strengthen the nation, for which we would be very grateful. I have spoken fully and frankly; as for whether this is apt, I earnestly await your instructions.

Telegram from Yang Zengxin, 24 October 1918 (sent 18 October), in Zhong-E guanxi shiliao, Minguo liunian zhi banian (1917-1919): Xinjiang bianfang, pp. 127-128.

International Women’s Day rally at a girls’ school in Ghulja, c. 1918. Source.

Xinjiang did not feature as much in the Japanese imperial imagination as Manchuria did, and the extensive troop deployment proposed by Narita did not materialise. Yang’s concerns, however, centred less on Japanese expansionism per se than on the province’s ethnic diversity. He had acquired and maintained power by balancing the interests of Xinjiang’s Han and Muslim populations. Any disruption to this equilibrium – be it from Whites, Reds or the Japanese – threatened to reignite ethnic tensions. Without referencing it directly, Yang’s telegram threatened Beijing with the spectre of another Dungan Revolt (1863-1877), when unrest among Xinjiang’s Hui population spread to other Turkic Muslims. “Loyalties turned elsewhere” as some Turki looked to Yaqub Beg for assistance and military leadership; the ensuing war led to the Russian occupation of Ili. This was not a risk he or Beijing should take.

Little is known of Narita’s activities after this episode; it seems that he remained at Dihua (today Urumqi), continued to provide Tokyo with intelligence and colluded with the White movement in the city. For his part, Yang consistently maintained that Xinjiang’s ethnic makeup rendered it particularly vulnerable to the effects of the Russian Civil War, including the refugee crisis, the spread of Bolshevik anti-imperialist propaganda and the recruitment of Muslim soldiers. As we shall see, it was the Russians and not the Japanese who would eventually upset his delicate balancing act as they, too, sought to use Xinjiang’s heterogeneity to their own advantage.

The Intervention, One Month On

Allied boots first hit Siberian ground under the Intervention in August 1918, with the arrival of first British, then French, Japanese, American, Chinese and Canadian forces in Vladivostok. They threw their weight behind the Czechoslovak advance up the Ussuri; Khabarovsk was the first to fall. Meanwhile, the Japanese deployed more troops along the Chinese Eastern Railway. They joined Semenov and the Czechoslovaks in the drive towards Chita via Manzhouli.

The Chinese interventionary headquarters in Vladivostok included civilian emissary Liu Jingren, Ambassador to Russia when the revolution broke out, and Commodore Lin Jianzhang, captain of the warship Hai Rong which had arrived in the city in April. As the Intervention got under way, Lin requested additional staff fluent in English, French and Japanese. The Foreign Ministry thus dispatched three representatives to the headquarters: Wang Tingzhang, Lü Liehuang and Zhang Shoumo. Wang had graduated from the University of Liège in Belgium and held a succession of diplomatic and foreign-language positions. Lü was one of the first youths sent to study in Japan following the Sino-Japanese War; while at the Tokyo Higher Normal School, he joined a student patriotic organisation. Less is known about Zhang’s background, but he subsequently served as a diplomat in Cuba, South Africa and Mexico. The following report was sent by Lü and Zhang in September:

Portrait of Commodore Lin Jianzhang taken in Vladivostok, 1920. Source.

八日奉上一電，諒蒙鈞鑒。茲綜合近日各方面所有戰訊，匯成報告一份，另紙奉呈，伏乞詧閱。聞各國軍隊司令部，有不久自崴移至伊爾庫茨克之說，烈煌特於昨日，隨林代將往見日本大谷司令，詢及此事，據云，將來大約當移往該地，惟目前尚未到時機耳。又日軍在西伯利亞發行軍用手票，此間俄人方面，議決提出抗議。西伯利亞政府，以日軍軍用票，破壞俄之經濟，亦以議及防止其傳播之方法。聞日軍軍用票，並擬在哈爾濱、滿洲里一帶流用，似亦應預籌對付之法。又聯合軍擬於過激派已告肅清之地域內，著手整頓經濟狀況，日本政府且已發布西伯利亞經濟委員會官制，竊已為此事與吾國僑民，及工商業所關當甚巨也。肅此，敬叩鈞安。

日本出騎兵先鋒隊，已於九月五日攻下勃利。六日佔領該地之兵器制造廠，得炮百二十門。又於七日包圍敵軍海軍根據地，捕獲河用炮艦十七隻，汽船三隻。

該地西北方黑龍江之大鐵橋，未為敵人破壞，故向西之火車，仍照常開行。

自黑河傳來信息云，目下由東、西兩方面逃入海蘭泡之過激派，已達三、四千人，該地陷於無政府狀況。彼等之一半，見大勢日非，頗傾向非戰論。而其他一半，則主張抵抗到底，並稱仍有不得已情形時，即將其根據地移至結雅河方面云。

又據他方面消息，德、奧俘虜軍之主力，及過激派之首領等，擬以阿萊克些夫斯克為根據地，以圖后策。此后究竟如何動作，目下尚不明瞭。

九月六日，大谷總司令官，為表明聯合國此次出兵來俄之目的，在海參崴及烏蘇裡戰線一帶地方，由飛機散布布告，曉諭俄人文曰：

告爾忠於祖國之俄國民：此次聯軍在俄領作戰之目的，在將我友軍乞開斯拉夫軍，由德、奧俘虜軍之手救出，並救濟苦於秕政涂炭為我友邦之俄國。故為我聯合軍之敵者，德、奧武裝俘虜也，我聯合軍未敢有與俄國之民交戰之意。

今也我聯合軍已集有雄厚兵力，方陸續追逐敵人，向前進行，想全滅德、奧俘虜軍，將俄國由敵之爪牙救出之期，當不遠矣。然德、奧俘虜軍於其敗退之際，將交通機關悉行破壞，就中因鐵道之破壞，使將來物資補給陷於困難，致令聯合軍之救濟俄國民更為延遲。忠於祖國之俄國國民，爾等其了解我聯合軍之目的，使我軍之戰爭行為容易進行，以圖迅速復興爾祖國。

自勃利陷落后，日本第十二師團，擬繼續急遽進行，為日后行動之准備，方在籌劃一切。在尼古拉愛衣斯克附近之海軍陸戰隊，為協助該軍，已遂次溯黑龍江而上。

滿洲里方面，乞開軍一部隊之第六聯隊，佔領尼羅秦斯克、及塞萊秦斯克后，擬繼續東進，以策應由勃利前進之日本軍。

在海蘭泡之過激派軍，及德、奧俘虜，共四千人。阿萊克些夫斯克有德、奧俘虜軍二千，及過激派四千。將來聯合軍之作戰目標，不外海蘭泡及阿萊克些夫斯克二地。

 

Soldiers of the US 27th Infantry training in the snow, c.1918. Source.

A telegram was sent on the 8th which we hope the Ministry has read. Now we are summarising the news on the war recently obtained from various sources, compiling them into a report; it is sent separately for Your perusal. It is said that the headquarters of the various national armies will soon move from Vladivostok to Irkutsk, hence Liehuang specially went with Commodore Lin yesterday to meet Japanese commander Otani to enquire about this. He said that in future they are likely to move there, but now the time has not yet come. Also, the Japanese are issuing military yen in Siberia; on this matter the Russians have resolved to lodge a protest. The Siberian Government, on the basis that the military yen damages the Russian economy, has also discussed a means to prevent its dissemination. We have heard that there are also plans to circulate the military yen in Harbin and Manzhouli, it seems that we should also draw up a plan to deal with this. Further, the Allied troops plan to begin putting the economic situation in order in areas that have been cleared of the bolsheviks. The Japanese government has even announced the staff of an economic committee. This matter will have a great impact on our migrants, industry and trade. With deepest regards to the Ministry.

Japan has dispatched frontline cavalry which took Irkutsk on 5 September. On the 6th they occupied the weapons factories there, obtaining 120 cannon. Also, on the 7th, they surrounded the enemy’s naval base, capturing 17 river gunboats and three steamers.

“The Japanese army occupied Habalofsk. Amur Fleet surrendered.” Japanese print from the series Illustration of the Siberian War, 1919. Source.

The large iron bridge across the Amur northwest of that area has not yet been destroyed by the enemy, hence westward trains are still running as normal.

News has arrived from Heihe that, currently, the number of bolsheviks fleeing to Blagoveshchensk from both the east and west has reached 3,000-4,000; the area has fallen into a state of anarchy. Half of them, seeing that the tide is turning further against them by the day, are much inclined to stop fighting. The other half instead proposes to resist to the end and have said that, if forced to, they will move their base to the Zeya River area.

Also, according to news from the locality, the main body of German and Austrian POWs, as well as the bolshevik leadership, plans to establish a base at Alekseevsk [the junction of the Trans-Siberian and the Blagoveshchensk line], as a backup plan. As for what their movements will be thereafter, this is not currently known.

On 6 September, commander-in-chief Otani, in order to convey the objectives of the Allied deployment in Russia, distributed an announcement via airplane in Vladivostok and the Ussuri front area. It informed the Russians of the following:

‘To patriotic Russian citizens: The objectives of the current Allied deployment in Russian territory are to rescue friendly forces – the Czechoslovaks – from the hands of German and Austrian POWs, and to aid our ally, Russia, suffering under misgovernment and devastation. Hence the enemy of the Allied troops is the armed German and Austrian POWs. The Allied troops in no way wish to do battle with the citizens of Russia.

‘Now the Allied troops have assembled a great military force to successively pursue the enemy and advance, with the intention to wipe out the German and Austrian POW soldiers. The moment when Russia is delivered from the jaws of the enemy is not far off. But as the German and Austrian POW soldiers are defeated and withdraw, they damage transport infrastructure completely. Due to the destruction of the railways, they will cause future difficulties in the supply of goods, further delaying Allied relief to the Russian people. Patriotic Russian citizens, you who understand the Allied objectives,  facilitate the Allied troops’ conduct of the war in order to swiftly restore your fatherland.’

Colonel John Ward of the 25th Middlesex with Czechoslovak commander Stephan on the Ussuri front, 1918. Source.

Since the fall of Khabarovsk, the Japanese 12th Division plans to advance urgently in preparation for future action; plans are being drawn up. The naval infantry near Nikolaevsk, in support of these troops, has successively gone upriver along the Amur.

News from Manzhouli is that after the 6th Regiment of the Czechoslovak Legion occupied Nerchinsk, they plan to proceed eastwards in order to join forces with the Japanese troops advancing from Khabarovsk.

The bolshevik troops in Blagoveshchensk, together with the German and Austrian POWs, number 4,000. There are 2,000 German and Austrian POWs in Alekseevsk, as well as 4,000 bolsheviks. Going forward, the Allied troops’ military objective will be none other than Blagoveshchensk and Alekseevsk.

Letter from Lü Liehuang and Zhang Shoumo, 17 September 1918. Zhong-E guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919): chubing Xiboliya, pp. 337-339.

Japanese military yen issued in Siberia, 1918. Source.

Much headway had been made in a month. Progress on the Ussuri front was matched by a rapid advance into Transbaikalia. By mid-September, Semenov had succeeded in linking up with the Czechoslovaks in Chita. Alekseevsk fell on the day Lü and Zhang’s report was recived, and Blagoveshchenk would follow two days later. Throughout these territories, Otani’s announcement reassured its audience that the Allies harboured no harmful intentions towards Russia. Instead, economic relief would soon follow.

Yet Lü and Zhang noted the introduction of the military yen in areas occupied by the Japanese, including not only the Russian Far East but the CER zone as well. Their concerns were matched by the Russians’: The arrival of the yen threatened to draw these territories into the Japanese imperial orbit and challenged an important marker of sovereignty, namely the issuing and control of one’s own national currency. Such fears were even more acute in the Manchurian context, in which the northern part of the province had become dominated by the ruble and the southern by the yen, following Japan’s South Manchurian Railway. With Allied assistance, Russia’s anti-bolshevik regimes would largely be able to resist the spread of the yen. The Chinese lacked such coordinated support and proved less capable of doing so; as we shall see, however, they would be more successful in ejecting the ruble from the Railway concession zone.

Merchant Opportunism in Khabarovsk

With the advent of Allied military intervention in Siberia, the Russian Civil War entered a new phase in the region. International attention was brought to bear on vital transport arteries in Manchuria and Vladivostok, gradually bringing them under Allied control. Foreign troops, weapons and money poured in to drive the Reds from power. The White movement was given a new lease of life as new, anti-bolshevik regimes sprang up in Harbin, Grodekovo, Vladivostok and Omsk. In Beijing, the central government actively supported the Intervention as a member of the Allies; on the Sino-Russian frontier, local officials struggled to deal with the emerging threats to border security and China’s command over its own territory.

The Chinese diaspora, too, was drawn into the conflict. We have already seen how the disorder that accompanied the November Revolution affected the Chinese merchant communities in Vladivostok and Blagoveshchensk, as well as how the Allied grain embargo crippled Chinese companies in Harbin that traded with Russia. Speaking through their chambers of commerce, they called on the Chinese authorities to protect their interests in Russia and enhance China’s international status more assertively. Such appeals only grew more insistent as fresh fighting broke out between Reds, Whites and Allied forces in autumn 1918, as the following letter from the Khabarovsk general chamber of commerce illustrates.

Chinese women in Khabarovsk. Source.

竊敝會僑居俄領之伯利埠，與吉林省屬之綏遠縣相壤接，最近處不過五十華里。該國自變更國體，黨爭劇烈，相傾相軋，各自割據，以致亂機四伏，僑民有岌岌可危之勢。前曾電請總長設法保護，計塵簽典。惟自亂黨柄國，內治不修，肆行均產，民不聊生，切克國人（俄附屬國）起於海參崴，反戈相向，亂黨勢已不支。在舊黨[?]情恐困獸反噬，有焚掠一空之虞，渴望中國軍隊入境，得借外援，以為護符。在亂黨自知大勢已去，難望持久，又兼日本海軍艦入廟境之港，亦恐借端染指，演成朝鮮之惡劇。故雖鷸蚌相爭，寧願舉而餉之中國，亦不願日本為漁人。敝會昧於國際交涉，罔識大體，在總長高掌遠蹠，自有權衡。竊以為機遇之乘，實千載一時之日。謹將伯利現在情形，上瀆聰聽，以資查核。

Our humble chamber resides in Khabarovsk in Russia, which is adjacent to Suiyuan County in Jilin Province, no more than 50 li at its nearest. Ever since that country changed its system of government, factional conflict has been fierce, each vying against the other and carving our their own fiefdoms, such that disorder lurks everywhere and us emigrants are in peril. We had previously wired the Minister to come up with a means of protection, which we humbly signed and presented. But since the Reds seized control of the country, internal governance has fallen into ruin and they have arbitrarily introduced equality of property, the people’s livelihoods are gone. The Czechs (a country subordinate to Russia) rose up in Vladivostok, turned their weapons around and the Reds already cannot hold out. Now the Whites [sic, likely Reds], in their panic, are like trapped beasts lashing out, and there is a fear that they will burn and loot everything to the ground. We earnestly wish that Chinese troops will enter the border so that we may have help from outside and thus gain protection. The Reds themselves know that their strength is ebbing and they cannot sustain themselves for long. Moreover, Japanese warships have entered Nikolaevsk harbour and one fears that they will take the opportunity to fish in muddy waters, creating another Korean tragedy.  Hence while there are advantages to be had in this internal struggle, we wish for China to reap the gains and not for Japan to be the beneficiary. Our humble chamber is ignorant about international diplomacy and only dimly understands the general situation. But our Minister’s vision is far-reaching and he must have weighed matters up. This is an opportunity to be taken, indeed the moment of a thousand years. Thus we are relating the situation in Khabarovsk for your consideration.

Letter from the Khabarovsk chamber of commerce, 29 August 1918. Zhong-e guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919): chubing Xiboliya, p. 303.

Ataman Kalmykov with members of the American Expeditionary Forces in Khabarovsk. From the Robert Eichelberger collection. Source.

Circumstances in Khabarovsk had reached a critical point by the time this letter was written. The Czechoslovak Legion, having launched a successful uprising in Vladivostok, was moving north along the Ussuri front towards the city. It was joined by anti-bolshevik commander Ataman I.P. Kalmykov, who had established himself at Grodekovo in July. As the Siberian Intervention commenced, Japanese, American, British and French forces arrived in the region in August; the Imperial Japanese Army’s 12th Division played a particularly active role in the Maritime Province. Pitched battles broke out in the third week of August between the Reds on one side and the Czechoslovaks, Kalmykov and the Japanese on the other as the latter advanced towards Khabarovsk.

The Khabarovsk chamber’s letter was therefore an appeal for protection, not only against the violence of the Civil War but also against Japanese imperial ambitions. Japan’s dispatch of warships to Nikolaevsk was framed as another iteration of the Sino-Japanese War, when a domestic rebellion in Korea escalated tensions between China and Japan, led to the landing of a Japanese expeditionary force at Incheon, and provoked an all-out battle between both countries that resulted in a humiliating Chinese defeat. Nevertheless, in the midst of fear there was also a sense of opportunism. Echoing the arguments used by Japanese proponents of intervention, the chamber argued that the disorder in Russia was the “moment of a thousand years”. China, not Japan, should take advantage of Russia’s weakness. In addition to this letter, the chamber also sent messages to the governors of the Manchurian provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang. Its leader travelled to Harbin, writing to the garrison there to call for Chinese troops to be sent to Khabarovsk. Another representative was sent to Vladivostok to seek help from the Chinese consul-general.

“Our cavalry’s occupied Khabarovsk and march-past took place in front of the enemy’s gun-boats”. Japanese print from the series Illustration of the Siberian War, 1919. Source.

Khabarovsk fell to Kalmykov and the Japanese in the first week of September. Despite the merchants’ fears, the city was abandoned by the Reds without much fighting. Armed with the chamber’s appeals, however, Vladivostok consul-general Shao Hengjun, Jilin governor Guo Zongxi, its military governor Meng Enyuan and Heilongjiang military governor Bao Guiqing pressed Beijing to send troops together with the Allies, in order to protect the Chinese diaspora and place at least some curbs on Japanese activity. Given that no direct reply was forthcoming from the Beijing government, either to the chamber’s letter or to the wires from Shao, Guo, Meng and Bao, it was therefore the Manchurian governors who emerged as champions of the diaspora in this episode.

Nevertheless, protection of one’s diaspora – or revenge for their mistreatment –  had emerged as a compelling diplomatic justification for military intervention. The Great Powers employed it in the Boxer Rebellion; Japanese hawks would resort to it during the Russian Civil War. In conveying the Khabarovsk chamber’s appeals, therefore, Manchurian officials not only bolstered their legitimacy among Chinese migrants, but also spoke a language that was internationally persuasive. Beijing’s silence was in fact uncharacteristic of its approach to diaspora petitions. As the sending of the Hai Rong to Vladivostok showed, when defence of migrant interests dovetailed with China’s diplomatic objectives, both central and local authorities were not averse to using the former to shore up the latter. This was a pattern that would continue as the Russian Civil War entered a new phase: that of the White Terror.

Conflict at Manzhouli

In previous posts, we looked at Japan’s escalating involvement in the Russian Civil War, culminating in the Sino-Japanese Joint Military Defence Agreement of May 1918 and the announcement of outright intervention in August. On both occasions, various Chinese actors – from Jilin military governor Meng Enyuan to civil society organisations in China and the diaspora community – voiced concerns over Japanese expansionism in the region. The deployment of Japanese troops in Manchuria and the Russian Far East seemed to prefigure a further erosion of Chinese sovereignty in the region. Even more galling, it threatened to roll back what China had gained so far out of Russia’s disorder: an expanded role on the Chinese Eastern Railway, including the newly formed Chinese garrison headquarters at Manzhouli.

Such fears did not take long to materialise. Already in late August, the Japanese troops that fanned out across the Railway came into conflict with the Manzhouli garrison.

Chinese soldiers at Manzhouli, March 1918. From the James Maxwell Pringle album. Source.

今午十二時，據滿站司令部馬日萬急電稱：

「本日午后六鐘，日參謀篠原來部聲稱，奉藤井師團長命令，前來接洽，首問駐滿華軍能否與日本共攻新黨。告以未奉中央命令，不能專斷。伊雲，駐滿華軍兵力過單，不足擔任，可即交日軍擔任，華軍可退駐后方，留數十名駐滿保護路線足矣。並限將所住營房，於明早五鐘前，全行騰給日兵居住，持謝軍所給函據為憑。查謝函開，凡鐵路以北營房，悉數歸日兵佔用，乃商將華軍移住南營房。篠原謂路南營房亦應歸日軍居住，刻不容緩，即須騰出。經再三交涉，始限明早十一鐘騰交。以強權武斷，萬難久處，應請於明日上午十鐘以前，指示遵行。否則空言搪塞，必誤時機，惟有率兵暫退后方，[俾]免釀舋」等情。

查上電於本日十二時始經接到，已在所限鐘點以后，恐前方軍隊已經撤退，亦未可知。除急飭令勿得輕退，一面電致藤井交涉外，煥相即將乘專車赴滿，相機辦理。省中日行事件，遵照督軍篠三電預示辦法，暫由政務廳長、王道尹、董廳長公同主持，並由邢參謀、故軍務課長相與幫助，遇有要事，仍電請督軍核示。侯俟煥相到滿后，察看情形，隨時飛報。惟當此次日軍舉動，志在乘機侵吞北滿，其借口滿站我軍單薄，迫令退出，已事在必行。將來沿線駐軍，恐亦在排斥之列，即不明為排斥，而路權若歸日人主持，交通難免受制。昨聞省垣、黑河日本均有駐兵之說，現在事機萬急，欲求不開舋端，惟有容忍之一法。究竟如何辦理，應請中央迅速指示，並請督軍早日回任主持。

This afternoon, at 12pm, an urgent telegram dated the 21st was received from the Manzhouli command, saying:

‘At 6pm today, Japanese staff officer Shinohara came to inform us that he was under orders from Division Commander Fujii to negotiate with us. First, he asked if the Chinese troops stationed in Manzhouli could join with Japanese forces in a common attack on the bolsheviks. We told him that without any orders from Beijing, we could not decide on this arbitrarily. He said that the Chinese troops stationed in Manzhouli were too weak and were not up to the task. Their posts should be immediately reassigned to the Japanese forces, with the Chinese soldiers moved to the rear, leaving only several dozen in Manzhouli sufficient to guard the railway. He stipulated that the barracks they are currently occupying should all be vacated for the housing of Japanese soldiers by 5am the next day. He had a letter from Semenov as proof. Semenov’s letter stated that all barracks north of the railway should be occupied by Japanese forces, and negotiations should be carried out to move the Chinese soldiers to the south barracks. Shinohara said that the barracks south of the railway should also be occupied by the Japanese, there could be no delay and we should vacate them immediately. After repeated negotiations, he finally specified that they should be vacated at 11am the next day. Faced with such forceful and dogmatic behaviour, it will be difficult to hold out for long. We ask for your instructions before 10am tomorrow. If not, stalling them with empty words will lose us precious time and we will have no choice but to temporarily withdraw the troops to the rear in order to prevent conflict.’

Since the above telegram was received only at 12pm today, after the deadline, one fears that the frontline troops have already been withdrawn but this has not been ascertained. Apart from urgently instructing the headquarters not to withdraw the troops lightly and wiring Fujii to negotiate, I will leave for Manzhouli immediately by special train to deal with the matter. The everyday affairs of the province – in keeping with the policy prescribed in the Military Governor’s three telegrams of the 17th – will be temporarily conducted by the administrative department, Circuit Intendant Wang and Department Chief Dong jointly. Staff officer Xing and Section Chief for Military Affairs Gu will assist. If important issues arise, the Military Governor will be consulted. Once I have arrived in Manzhouli and investigated the situation, I will report rapidly. However, this move by the Japanese is intended to create the opportunity to invade and occupy northern Manchuria. Their pretext, that our troops at Manzhouli are too weak, and their forcing us to withdraw were necessary steps. One fears that the troops stationed along the railway will also be eliminated in future. Even if they [the troops] are not removed outright, if the Japanese take charge of railway rights, transport will unavoidably fall under their control. Yesterday I heard a rumour that the Japanese are stationing troops in the provincial capital [Qiqihar] and Heihe. The situation is now critical and if we do not wish to start a fight, we can do nothing but tolerate them. As for how this situation should be managed, I ask that instructions be quickly sought from Beijing and that the Military Governor return soon to take matters in hand.

Telegram from Zhang Huanxiang, 23 August 1918 (sent 22 August). Zhong-e guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919): chubing Xiboliya, pp. 277-278.

The railway station at Manzhouli. From the Robert Eichelberger collection. Source.

The Sino-Russian border station of Manzhouli had been a flashpoint already in January 1918. After the Chinese had disarmed the pro-bolshevik Russian railway guard at Harbin and other stations on the CER in late-December 1917, troops from Heilongjiang were sent to oversee their expulsion at Manzhouli. In February 1918, the Manzhouli garrison headquarters was established just as Semenov’s forces were being pushed towards Chinese territory by the Reds. The Chinese then had to negotiate with the Reds to allow Semenov to escape pursuit. Now Japanese involvement destabilised the area yet again. By late August, more than 5,000 men from the Imperial Japanese Army’s 7th Division had arrived, emboldening Semenov and stoking tensions with the Chinese forces that had only just taken the place of the Russian guard. Further Japanese deployments took place during this time at Harbin, Fulaerji, Ang’angxi and Boketu, with similar disputes over barracks and policing responsibilities.

Nevertheless, China’s hands were tied by the Joint Defence Agreement and its own ongoing civil war. In response to the complaint from Zhang and his superiors in Manchuria, the Beijing government replied that Manzhouli was still within Chinese territory and, under the terms of the Agreement, Japan was allowed to station its troops there. Although local officials wanted Beijing to bolster their troops in the region, this was impossible given the fighting between northern and southern governments in Hunan. The situation was defused only by the arrival of Fujii Kotsuchi, the 7th Division’s commander. He acknowledged that the barracks issue had not been handled well and instructed that Japanese troops use the quarters originally allocated to them. Interestingly enough, Fujii was endorsed by Jilin military governor Meng, who had earlier expressed his objections to the Defence Agreement.

General Fujii Kotsuchi in 1919. Source.

Fujii’s sojourn in Manzhouli was brief; he was passing through to lead his forces into Transbaikalia together with Semenov. The quarrel between Chinese and Japanese forces, however, was a taste of things to come. Torn between their interests in the Russian Civil War and the promise of Japanese support in their own internal conflicts, Manchurian militarists and the Beijing government struggled to find a coherent approach to Russia’s newfound weakness. In this, they mirrored their cossack warlord counterparts who had to balance their anti-bolshevik aspirations with the pitfalls of accepting Japanese aid. With the Siberian Intervention underway, however, Manchurian officials were eventually able to play off Allied and Japanese interests and maintain their prerogatives on the CER – a tactic that Semenov and other anti-bolsheviks could not exploit.

Japanese Troops on the Move

In a previous post, we saw how Beijing was already exploring the idea of military intervention in Siberia in February 1918. The Duan government went so far as to sign a Joint Military Defence Agreement with Japan in May, with an eye to “defensive action” against the influence of the Central Powers in Russia. As long as Allied opinion remained divided, however, actual deployment proved elusive. Washington was concerned about the impact on Russian public opinion, as well as the potential for expanding Japan’s influence in Northeast Asia. The Japanese government was split between hawks and doves, with the former kept restrained by America’s lukewarm attitude.

The Czechoslovak Legion’s revolt in summer 1918 broke the deadlock. In America, military intervention could now be sold as assistance to the embattled Legion, fighting heroically against German and Austrian POWs. On 6 July, Washington decided in favour of intervention. This gave the Japanese hawks the ammunition they needed and, on 16 July, the Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs (Gaiko Chosakai) approved a draft calling for the deployment of an unrestricted number of troops to Siberia.

Commemorative postcards of the 14th Division’s deployment to Siberia. The division headquarters were in Utsunomiya. Source.

Even before this, however, the Japanese military began increasing its support for anti-bolshevik forces. Military advisors had been dispatched to both Semenov and Horvath since the beginning of 1918. Now a steady stream of soldiers began trickling towards the front, much to the alarm of Chinese officials.

協約各國共同出兵問題，已有動機，不久必見諸事實等情，曾於有日電呈在案，已邀鈞鑒。頃據確實探報，近有日本兵士，俱著便服，或一、二百，或三、五百名不等，由南滿、中東兩路陸續至海參崴、哈爾濱、滿洲裡等處。雖未持有槍械，而隨行車上，各載有木箱若干，內裝何物，不許他人過問，復不受檢查，其為暗運槍彈，不問可知。此項兵士，系該國之義勇隊與退伍之陸軍，便裝出發，分布崴、哈等處，並不頒布動員令，以防各國之詰責。其用意至深，其居心叵測。從各方面探得確實消息，征以本署顧問齊藤中佐之言，大約以義勇隊赴滿助謝，以退伍之陸軍為共同出兵之前驅。一俟協約國實行出兵時，彼即改易軍服，集而成軍等情。謹電馳聞。伏乞垂鑒。

On the issue of joint Allied intervention, there have been some developments and we will soon see the truth of the matter. I had previously wired about this on the 25th for your perusal. Now, according to accurate reports, there have recently been Japanese soldiers dressed in civilian uniforms, in groups of 100-200 or 300-500, travelling in succession via the South Manchurian and Chinese Eastern Railways to Vladivostok, Harbin and Manzhouli. Although they are not bearing arms, they are accompanied by trains each carrying several wooden crates. As for what these contain, they do not permit others to enquire and will not submit to checks. That they are being used to secretly transport weapons need not even be asked. These soldiers are volunteers and demobilised infantrymen of that country, leaving in civilian clothes and stationed in Vladivostok, Harbin etc. Moreover, no mobilisation order has been announced in order to forestall questions from other countries. Their intentions are extremely obscure and it is hard to guess at their purposes. Based on accurate information obtained from various sources, an enquiry was made with Colonel Saito – an advisor with my office – who said it is likely that the volunteers are going to Manzhouli to aid Semenov and the demobilised infantry will be frontline troops for the joint intervention. Once the Allies carry out the intervention, they will immediately switch to military uniform and assemble as a force. For your kind consideration.

Telegram from Meng Enyuan, 28 July 1918. Zhong-e guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919): chubing Xiboliya, p. 224.

Postcard commemorating the Japanese military presence in Sakhalin, depicting the 32nd Regiment leaving Aomori. Source.

Semenov had been under pressure from the Reds at Manzhouli since June, and some of the soldiers mentioned in Meng’s telegram were indeed members of a 500-strong volunteer battalion – organised by Major-General Muto Nobuyoshi – sent to rescue him. In April, the Japanese had also landed several hundred troops from their warships in Vladivostok, providing cover for the demobilised soldiers. But whatever the exact number or destination of these forces, they were a sign of the Imperial Japanese Army’s broad scope of action in Manchuria and the Russian Far East. Already in February, Vice-Chief of Staff Tanaka Giichi, one of the foremost advocates of unilateral intervention, had set up a secret Military Affairs Cooperative Committee to prepare for full-scale operations in Siberia. And even as the Terauchi government and the popular press debated the desirability of intervention, the army general staff had a free hand in sponsoring anti-bolshevik clients and mobilising emigre volunteers.

More galling for Meng – in spite of his own entanglements with Japanese advisors –  was China’s inability to do anything about these troop movements. The Joint Defence Agreement expressly permitted the Japanese army to use the CER for military purposes, as long as it did not contravene the original Sino-Russian railway treaties. This was the first inkling that Duan Qirui’s appeasement of the Japanese would have dire consequences for China’s authority over the Railway zone.

Japanese troops landing in Vladivostok, 12 August 1918. Source.

On 2 August, after an exchange of notes with the Americans, the Japanese government officially announced its intention to send its forces to Vladivostok. This was framed as a response to German and POW activity in Russia and a defence against “chaos”. What was missing, however, was a firm commitment to the American proviso that the number of troops be limited to 7,000. Instead, the Japanese reserved the right to send reinforcements if necessary, following consultation with the Allies. Troops could also be deployed in areas other than Vladivostok.

With the brakes now taken off the Imperial Japanese Army, there was no more need for subterfuge. The first elements of the 12th Division left Kokura for Vladivostok on 10 August; one day after they landed, the division commander requested immediate reinforcements. The Japanese government then agreed that the 7th Division, stationed along the South Manchurian Railway, would be sent to bolster Semenov in Manzhouli, directly contravening the original declaration but permissible under the Sino-Japanese Joint Defence Agreement. These were followed by yet further reinforcements from South Manchuria called up by the general staff, asserting its “right of supreme command” in the battlefield without consulting civilian politicians. Just three weeks after the Japanese announcement, the stage was set for large-scale military operations across East Siberia and the Russian Far East.

Horvath Moves into Russia

In a previous post, we saw how the revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion ousted local soviets along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Anti-bolshevik governments of varying stripes sprung up in their wake. A moderate socialist regime emerged in Vladivostok under P.Ia. Derber and, as the Czechoslovaks advanced from Vladivostok to Nikol’sk-Ussuriisk in early July, emboldened White forces captured Grodekovo on the Sino-Russian border. For Horvath in Harbin, the chance to take his fledgling regime to Russia – and away from the disapproval of the Chinese authorities – was irresistable.

By this stage, Chinese officials had been attempting to thwart Horvath’s organisational efforts in China for several months. Harbin foreign affairs official Li Jiaao, one of several interlocutors charged with keeping the Horvath group in line, described the announcement of the move to Grodekovo.

Horvath’s cabinet in Grodekovo, including (from left) S.A. Taskin, A.M. Okorokov, V.A. Glukharev, M.O. Kurskii, V.E. Flug, L.A. Ustrugov, S.V. Vostrotin. Source.

五日電計先邀覽。昨赴霍處阻止在路線界內組織政府，渠稱：

「業定今晚赴﹝四？﹞站察看情形，或赴雙城子圖晤赤軍，預備組織，萬一不洽，立即折回。萬一徼幸，當請假一月，即在雙城子組織政府，以扼海參崴西伯利亞政府，免致第二激黨出現。」

旋晤日英領事，談及此事，均贊成，惟美領事似不以為然，恐未能多談。今又赴晤，據稱：「昨晚霍同行者，除彼同志八十八人外，尚有日本國武員八人，英國武員一人。」又聞有日軍四百在軍助戰，詢諸日本領事，亦明認三百，則日英之助霍已確，無怪霍欣然而去。經交涉再三勸阻，且告以：「出境雖異﹝易﹞，入境恐難，二十年心血經營之鐵路，將付諸東流乎。」渠雖嘆息再三，仍難中止，則此中或有他故。

美領事亦經疑及霍與東人有約，勸我及早收回主權，美國必相助。若果落到東人，亦祇能以奉路相看，不承認安置軍隊，管理地方，緣此路合同尚在，不能與南滿洲同日而語。且雲：「霍與美人素來異視，如英日禁其在哈購地，美人則無此權利，萬難甘心，本領事將呈請政府趁此時期交涉，使中國主權得以完全收回。」交涉員告以：「中國與美國交誼最睦，當將尊意電達政府。」渠即欣悅道感。窺此情形，霍之改赴境外組織，系美領事之力也。

美領事既有助我收回主權之意，我國可乘機速圖進行。況近來日本國軍、警、財政人員絡繹來哈，雖以調查為名，似有布置。我國兵力未足，應如何籌備之處，宜未雨綢繆。是否有當，侯電遵。

I trust that the telegram of the 5th has been received. Yesterday, I went to Horvath to prevent the formation of a government in the Railway zone. He said:

‘I have already decided to go to Grodekovo this evening to observe the situation, and may proceed to Nikol’sk-Ussuriisk with the intention of meeting the Czech troops to prepare for an organisation. If we cannot come to an agreement, I will immediately return. If, against the odds, I succeed, I will take a month’s leave and establish a government in Ussuriisk, in order to seize the Siberian [Derber] government in Vladivostok and prevent a second bolshevik party from emerging.’

Li Jiaao, Harbin foreign affairs official from April 1918 to February 1919. Source.

I then went to meet the Japanese and British consuls. Speaking of this matter, they both approved, but it seemed that the American consul objected and it could not be discussed further. Today I met him [the American consul] again. He said, ‘Last night, among those who travelled with Horvath, apart from 88 of his comrades there were also eight Japanese and one British officer.’ He had also heard that there were 400 Japanese soldiers among the troops, aiding them in battle, and made enquiries with the Japanese consul, who admitted that there were 300 of them. Since it is now clear that the Japanese and British are helping Horvath, it is little wonder that he left so buoyantly. During our negotiations I repeatedly advised him against it, telling him, ‘It is easy to leave the border, but entering it may be difficult. The Railway, run with such toil and sweat over 20 years, will be swept away.’ Although he sighed several times, he could not break things off, or there may be other reasons for this.

The American consul has also already suspected Horvath of having an agreement with the easterners [Japanese], and advised us to recover our sovereignty as soon as possible, which America will support [emphasis mine]. If it does indeed fall to the easterners, they should be regarded as only serving the Railway, not permitted to station troops or manage the area, since the Railway agreement is still in force and it cannot be treated the same as the South Manchurian Railway. He then said, ‘Horvath and the Americans have never seen eye to eye. Like the British and Japanese, who are prohibited from buying land in Harbin[?], the Americans have no such privileges. This is far from satisfactory. I will write to my government to take this opportunity for negotiations, such that Chinese sovereignty may be completely recovered.’ I told him, ‘The friendship between China and America is most cordial, I will convey your opinion to our government.’ He then thanked us warmly. Judging by this situation, Horvath’s shift towards establishing a government outside the border must be the American consul’s doing.

Since the American consul intends to help us recover our sovereignty, our country may take this opportunity and swiftly make plans to proceed. After all, Japanese troops, police and finance officials have recently been coming to Harbin in droves. Although they claim to be observers, they seem to have other assignments. Our country’s military strength is still insufficient and, no matter what preparations should be made, we must plan for all contingencies. As for whether this is appropriate, I await your instructions.

Telegram from Li Jiaao, 10 July 1918 (sent 8 July). Zhong-E guanxi shiliao, Minguo liunian zhi banian (1917-1919). Dongbei bianfang (1), p. 277.

Chinese officials welcoming the Stevens mission in Harbin. Source.

Even before his departure from Harbin, therefore, Horvath’s ambitions were lofty in the extreme. On 9 July, he proclaimed himself Provisional Supreme Ruler of Russia in Grodekovo, in direct opposition to the Derber government. Unlike in his statement to Li, Horvath undertook this without an agreement with the Czechoslovaks, who controlled Nikol’sk-Ussuriisk. Worse still, he denied them passage on the Chinese Eastern Railway, which they had requested in order to aid fellow legionnaires in western Siberia.

Perhaps even more breathtaking was Li’s claim that the American consul in Harbin, Charles Moser, had openly voiced his support for the recovery of Chinese sovereignty over the Railway zone. Already in March 1918, the American-led Russian Railway Service Corps – helmed by engineer John F. Stevens – had established its presence on the CER in order to facilitate the smooth running of the line. Given the pressing needs of the Czechoslovak Legion, it seems highly unlikely that Moser would suggest anything that would destabilise the Railway. Neither was it in American interests to transplant Horvath to Russia; again, this only antagonised the Czechoslovaks and the Derber government.

Li’s account is in fact directly contradicted by Moser’s own communique. According to Moser, it was a “Chinese governor” who expressed the wish to “regain complete sovereignty” over the Railway, but needed men and money to do so.

He wished my advice. I refused to suggest the possibility of American cooperation and assistance for which he seemed to be fishing, and he left me with the impression that he was unsatisfied and would call again. Chinese attitude in this matter surprising, unless instigated by Japan.

Why, then, did Li present this as an American proposal? A fluent Russian speaker, Li was no stranger to the Railway zone or to diplomacy. His experience in Harbin dated back to the 1911 Revolution and he had fulfilled consular functions in Vladivostok. Li was probably representing Jilin Governor Guo Zongxi, as Moser’s telegram suggests. Both men may have been trying to coax Beijing into a more assertive stance on the Railway; Guo had been appointed President of the Railway Board in December 1917 and this would have helped consolidate his authority.  At a time when America’s moral authority still held sway in China – and before the rise of the May 4th Movement less than a year later – using Moser as a mouthpiece must have seemed the most persuasive choice.