The Manchurian Grain Embargo

In January 1918, following the Bolshevik seizure of power, the Beijing government placed an embargo on Manchurian exports to Siberia. Consular certification was necessary to send goods, including basic foodstuffs, to Vladivostok and Irkutsk. This revealed some cracks in Allied policy: Britain and France had insisted on the embargo, Russian ambassador Kudashev disapproved, and the American government feared that it would alienate ordinary Russians.

Street scene in Fujiadian, the Chinese-controlled sector of Harbin. Source.

Given the extensive trade links between China and Russia, it was natural that Chinese merchants would also suffer as a result. While America petitioned the other Allied powers to lift the embargo throughout the spring, Chinese firms wrote their own protests. A joint letter from Dong He Hong and 23 other Harbin grain firms provides an insight into the volume of trade, prices, and the types of argument used in support of the merchants’ position.

竊查哈爾濱開埠二十年，市面發展，幾與津、滬並稱，實以糧商為中堅。糧商之業務，營運小麥、元豆，專恃出口為大宗，元豆行銷於東西各國，常年輸出額可達三千萬普特（每普特合華秤三十觔），小麥行銷俄國境內，常年輸出額可達一千萬普特，輸出愈繁，獲利愈鉅，市面之發展亦愈速，此其大較也。自歐戰發生，元豆輸出額頓減數量，商等已顯受影響，然尚可營運小麥，行銷俄境以內，故糧商雖困，尚未至於大困。近因俄國軍工黨蠢蠢肆擾，外交團要求政府並小麥亦禁止出口，糧價遂一落千丈。客冬商等買存糧石，小麥每普特計合羌洋十二元，元豆每普特計合羌洋八元，今春小麥價值每普特僅合羌洋三元有奇，元豆每普特僅合羌洋二元有奇，其實空懸行市，並無實存之戶，將來之跌落，仍無限度。就商等現狀言之，已皆虧累不堪，倘糧價再跌，勢必全體倒閉，債務相關，彼此牽連，恐其他商戶亦不能支矣。商等切膚之患，即哈埠市面盛衰關鍵，擬懇恩予轉詳，特弛小麥出口之禁，不惟商等死灰復燃，即市面亦蒙無疆之庥。

The port city of Harbin has been established for 20 years; the development of its markets can almost be mentioned in the same breath as Tianjin and Shanghai, with the grain trade at its core. The business of grain merchants involves trading in wheat and soybeans, with reliance chiefly on exports. Soybeans are sold in both eastern and western countries, and in an average year exports can each 30 million pud (each pud equivalent to 30 Chinese jin). The wheat is sold in Russian territory, with average annual exports reaching 10 million pud. The more exports there are, the higher the profit and the more rapidly the market develops; such is the situation in general. Since the European War occurred, the tonnage of soybean exports has fallen and we have clearly been affected. However, it was still possible to deal in wheat, to be sold in Russian territory. Hence, although the grain merchants were troubled, this did not reach the level of great distress.

Recently, because the Russian workers’ and soldiers’ faction was provoking unrest, the diplomatic corps asked the government to restrict exports of wheat as well and its price has then fallen precipitously. Last winter, we bought and stockpiled grain, with wheat at 12 rubles and soybean at 8 rubles per pud. This spring the price of wheat is only a little more than 3 rubles, and soybeans a little more than 2 rubles per pud. In fact these are only abstract quotes, without any real sales, and future depreciation will be limitless. Speaking of our current situation alone, we are all experiencing intolerable losses. If grain prices were to fall again, it would lead to wholesale collapse and, with the issue of debt involved, one fears that other merchants would also not be able to maintain themselves. The imminent peril we face will determine whether the Harbin market thrives or declines. We earnestly ask that you look favourably on our report and lift the embargo on wheat exports in particular. Not only will we have a new lease on life, the market too will obtain immeasurable relief.

Sacks of soybeans in Harbin, 1931. Source.

The petition thus begins with no small measure of alarmism and reiterates the importance of the merchants’ success to that of the city as a whole. It then goes further to emphasise the benefits of trade for the treasury as well as for the people at large.

況穀賤傷農，故有名言，若糧食得以出口，價值必漸升騰，鄉屯墾戶，利賴亦多。且糧石由玻璃、黑河等地出口者，概由江船裝運，按江關稅則，每小麥一百斤抽收稅銀六分六厘六毫六絲，每普特計重三十斤，若出口有一千萬普特之小麥，計重三萬萬斤，通盤合算，可增收稅銀二十二萬二千一百九十餘兩。縱由火車分運半數，然江船裝運，尚有五百萬普特，亦總可增收稅銀一十一萬一千零九十餘兩，實於鈞關收入，大有補助。或者疑為小麥出口，如北滿民食何。或者又疑俄國軍工黨多係親德派，若小麥出口，未必不轉濟德國民食，如齎盜糧何。商等謹證之事實，以釋此疑。查北滿一代，居民樸素，專食紅糧、小米、包米等糧，凡一切冠婚喪祭及購置農具，全恃糶賣豆麥，以供需用，今弛出口之禁，不惟無礙民食，且於農家日用，多所活動。

After all, low grain prices harm farmers – this is a well-known saying. If grain can be exported, its price will gradually rise and the villages and farms will have more to depend on. Moreover, the grain exported from Khabarovsk and Heihe is all transported by ship. Going by the river customs duties, 0.06666 yuan is levied on each 100 jin of wheat. Each pud is 30 jin. If 10 million pud of wheat is exported, equivalent to 300 million jin, a total of more than 222,190 liang in duties may be levied. Even if half were exported by rail, a remaining 5 million pud would still be transported by ship, and a total of more than 111,090 liang in duties may be levied. It would indeed be a great boost to the income of your customs.

One may wonder: If wheat were exported, what would the people of North Manchuria eat? Or one may suspect that most of the Russian workers’ and soldiers’ party are pro-German and, if wheat were exported, would it not be used to supply the German people, like feeding thieves? We carefully consider the facts in order to address these queries. In the North Manchurian region, the people are simple and mainly eat grains such as sorghum, millet and maize. The conduct of coming-of-age ceremonies, weddings, funerals and sacrifices, as well as purchasing of farm equipment, are entirely dependent on the sale of soybean and wheat to meet their needs. By lifting the embargo now, not only would the people’s food supply be unaffected, it would also greatly support the farmers’ daily expenses.

The merchants then conclude with an argument not unlike that of the Americans’, that supplying the Russians would generate goodwill and draw support away from the Bolsheviks.

Premises of the Binjiang chamber of commerce. Source.

人之恆情，大抵為人之心，不敵其救死之心，向來北滿小麥輸入俄境，僅敷該國民食之用，無再轉輸他國之餘裕，矧俄國大兵之際，連年荒旱，凡軍工黨之份子，其反對政府者，不過十之一二，其迫於飢寒者，實占十之八九，今弛小麥出口之禁，俄民飢而遇食，救死不瞻，更何能接濟他國。且飲食粗足，一般窮極思亂之軍工黨，或可稍為息心。果爾，則吾國邊防，不至吃緊，俄國內亂，亦可減輕，此等利益，當亦為俄國舊政府所承認。總之，小麥出口，非惟惠商，且可利農，非惟增收稅入，亦可藉弭邊患。而揆諸救災恤鄰之道，更屬仁至義盡，一舉數善，何憚不為。商等不揣冒昧，為此呈請鈞署轉詳財政部，提交國務會議，向外交團交涉，仍許西比利亞鐵路並黑河、玻璃等處運輸小麥出口，以恤商艱，而集眾益，不勝感激待命之至。

It is a common sentiment, in general, for one’s own self-interest to be superceded by the desire to save others. All along, the export of wheat from North Manchuria to Russia has been sufficient only for the needs of the Russian people, with no surplus that can be transferred to another country. And now Russia is at war, with successive years of drought and famine. Of the members of the workers’ and soldiers’ party, those who oppose the government make up one or two out of ten; those forced to do so by cold and hunger in fact make up eight or nine out of ten. If the wheat embargo is lifted now, the hungry Russian people will have food. It may not even be sufficient to save them, so how can they relieve another country? Moreover, with sufficient food and drink, the workers’ and soldiers’ party – which always hungers after disorder – may be diminished somewhat. If so, our country’s border defences will not come under threat and Russia’s internal troubles may also lessen. Such benefits would naturally be acknowledged by the former Russian government as well.

In sum, the export of wheat will not only favour the merchants, but also benefit the farmers; not only increase tax income, but also resolve border troubles. And exercising the principle of saving a neighbour from catastrophe – that would be the utmost expression of kindness. One act alone would bring many virtues, why fear a bad outcome? We presume to ask your office to convey this to the Finance Ministry and bring it before the State Council for discussion and negotiation with the diplomatic corps, that export shipments of wheat via the Siberian railway, Heihe and Khabarovsk etc may be permitted, to relieve the merchants’ hardship and bring benefit to the masses. We await your instructions with deepest gratitude.

Letter from the Maritime Customs, 11 May 1918. Zhong-e guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919). E zhengbian yu yiban jiaoshe (1), pp. 367-368.

The language of the petition, replete with ethical terms, reveals an expansive conception of the merchants’ social role. Merchants (shang) ranked low in the Confucian social hierarchy. During the late-Qing reform movement, however, commercial strength became linked to national revival and merchants were expected to play a role in bolstering China’s economic status. At the same time, they drew upon Buddhist and Confucian ideas of virtue to justify economic goals – not unlike the Christian arguments employed by some American anti-bolsheviks during this period.

Changing circumstances in Siberia – most notably, the revolt of the Czech Legion – brought an end to the embargo in late-June. Nevertheless, as commerce suffered further shocks from the Russian Civil War, Chinese merchants continued to issue similar petitions. The language of protest only grew more strident as merchants came under direct attack from both Reds and Whites.

Premier Duan Qirui and the Harbin Whites

By spring 1918, Chinese officials had tired of White antics. Semenov’s offensives into Transbaikalia threatened border security when they failed. Horvath’s political machinations in Harbin were an affront to Chinese sovereignty. They continued to recruit Chinese soldiers despite official objections, and their reliance on Japanese support was all too apparent. Already in April, Jilin Military Governor Meng Enyuan declared that “an increase in the Whites’ strength is not necessarily to our advantage”. Manchurian warlords and the Foreign Ministry lodged multiple protests with White leaders in an attempt to rein in their activities.

The Whites tried to circumvent these complaints by appealing to a higher authority: Prime Minister Duan Qirui, who headed the Beijing government for much of the initial period of the Russian Civil War. This was especially crucial with the new Chinese Eastern Railway board – in effect an anti-bolshevik government-in-exile – that Kudashev, Horvath and Kolchak were assembling in Harbin. According to the treaties that established the Railway zone, the Chinese had a say in railway management. Kudashev and Horvath were therefore anxious to obtain Duan’s approval for this venture, as we have seen in a previous document. Duan’s response was unequivocal.

Duan Qirui, successor to Yuan Shikai, ushered in Republican China’s warlord period. Source.

頃庫使等來談，瑞以不便，恐多疑慮，說之至再，告以再與外交[部？]商酌。即請貴部妥酌，並頌子興仁兄時綏。弟瑞。

中東鐵路總辦陸軍中將霍爾瓦特布告諭令僑居鐵路界內之俄民
查中東鐵路界為中華民國領土之一部份，所有僑居該鐵路界內之外國人，均歸本國法律之統轄，且尊重中國主權，並嚴守各本國與中國所訂之約章。

俄國前成立公民代表之政府，中國政府迄今尚未承認，亦未使其權推及鐵路界內，因是新發生之情況，亟有指定特別辦法之必要，免出無政府之難容情態。

本總辦系由各國承認俄國臨時政府之代表，迄今仍舊留任。茲不得不對於僑居鐵路界內之俄人急須行使政治權，以俄國成立正式政府時為止。其俄國與中國前定各約，毫無違背。

查俄國公民代表之政府，取消俄國之舊法，發布新令，而此項新令在俄人與各外國人雜處他國之地不能施行，是以本總辦仰飭中東鐵路界內常駐或暫設之俄國各官署及公共團體並界內僑居之各俄人，嚴守俄國臨時政府時代施行之法令。至本總辦嗣后行使統治權及根據鐵路界特別情況發出之命令布告，亦應一律嚴守無違。特此布告，以便周知。

朱鶴翔秘書口頭答復俄使庫達攝福
查俄國舊政府及克倫斯基政府業經先后推倒，其新政府各國均未承認。現時俄使仍能在北京繼續行其職務，純系中國及各友邦顧念從前友誼關系。至霍爾瓦特地位，此種情形，實為中國所獨有，但瓦[霍？]氏現時仍能駐在中國，保全其地位，實因前此哈埠亂時，中國軍隊代為驅逐廣義派之結果。是中東鐵路治安，自應仍由中國設法維持，霍氏萬不能[於？]協定辦法之外別有舉動，更不能在中國境內行使其統治權。此項布告，中國實難承認。
再瓦[霍？]氏擬在中國境內招兵一節，於中國治安大有妨害，一並不能允認。

Ambassador Kudashev etc came to speak with me [about this]; I find it inopportune and fear that it will raise many doubts. I said so several times and told them to discuss it again with the Foreign Ministry. Could your Ministry negotiate with them? Sending my dear friend Zixing [Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang’s courtesy name] my deepest well-wishes. Yours, Rui.

Notice from CER General Manager General Horvath to the Russians in the Railway Zone
The CER Zone is part of Chinese territory. All foreigners living within it are under the legal jurisdiction of our country [Russia], respecting Chinese sovereignty and abiding strictly by the treaties signed between our country and China.

The citizens’ representative [soviet] government lately established in Russia has not yet been recognised by the Chinese government. Nor did the Chinese government enable it to extend its authority throughout the Railway zone. Due to the changing circumstances, there is an urgent need for extraordinary measures to prevent the emergence of an intolerable state of anarchy.

As the internationally-recognised representative of the Russian Provisional Government, the General Manager retains his position. At present he has no choice but to urgently take up political responsibilities towards the Russians living in the Railway zone until an official government is established in Russia. This represents no violation of the treaties formerly signed between Russia and China.

The citizens’ representative government in Russia abolished Russia’s old laws and issued new decrees. These decrees cannot be implemented in other countries, where Russians and foreigners live among each other. The General Manager instructs all permanent or temporary Russian state agencies and civic societies, as well as the Russians living in the Railway zone, to abide strictly by the laws implemented during the Provisional Government. Decrees and announcements issued by the General Manager in the exercise of political authority, based on the special circumstances in the Railway zone, must also be adhered to without exception. To be disseminated to all.

Secretary Zhu Hexiang’s verbal reply to Kudashev
The old Russian government and Kerensky were toppled one after the other; the new government is not recognised by any other country. That the Russian Ambassador in Beijing is now still able to carry out his duties is purely due to Chinese and Allied considerations for our previous friendly relations. As for Horvath’s status, such a situation is truly unique to China. That he may now still be stationed in China, maintaining his position, is merely the result of Chinese troops driving out the Bolsheviks on his behalf during the [December 1917] disorder in Harbin. The maintenance of order on the CER should naturally be upheld by China. Horvath can in no way act outside of treaty provisions or, what is more, exercise political authority in Chinese territory. This announcement cannot be acknowledged by China. And as for Horvath’s plan to recruit in Chinese territory, this seriously undermines the maintenance of order in China and cannot be permitted as well.

Letter from Duan Qirui to the Foreign Minister, 1 May 1918. Zhong-E guanxi shiliao, Minguo liunian zhi banian (1917-1919). Dongbei bianfang (1), pp. 179-181.

The Duan cabinet of March 1918. Lu and Duan are third and fourth from right respectively. Source.

Duan was clearly displeased with Horvath’s announcement. It represented China’s worst fears: Barely a few months after the Chinese had taken over policing responsibilities on the Railway, another group of Russians was encroaching on their sovereignty in the Railway zone.

But such a firm stance was unusual for Duan. Up until this point, Kudashev’s strategy of appealing to him over the heads of local officials and the Foreign Ministry had worked. At a meeting in April, Kudashev had obtained Duan’s blessing for Semenov’s rearmament and to continue recruiting Chinese as long as they were dressed in Russian uniforms. Duan had also promised the Japanese military attache in Beijing to reprimand border officials for disarming White troops fleeing Blagoveshchensk. The issue of sovereignty in the Railway zone tested his limits, but Duan was willing to tolerate far more from the Whites than his officials were.

The reasons for this are not difficult to uncover. Duan had inherited a country divided over the authoritarian legacy of Yuan Shikai and was determined to reunify China by force. Yet his hawkish politics only deepened existing schisms. It was his attempt to push through the declaration of war against Germany that definitively split the country between Northern and Southern governments in August 1917. To boost his military strength, Duan’s government negotiated the 145m-yen Nishihara Loans with Japan in 1917-1918; it was also during the spring of 1918 that the Sino-Japanese Joint Defence Agreement was being negotiated. As such, Duan could hardly be expected to act decisively against Japan’s other prospective clients – the White leaders of the Sino-Russian frontier.

A Republic divided: Yuan Shikai on the left and Sun Yat-sen on the right, both with the title of President. Source.

Hence, China’s irresolution against the Whites stemmed from more than a need to maintain a united, anti-Bolshevik front with the Allies. They were fighting their own civil war, which drained financial and military resources and undermined political decision-making at the very top. While the Foreign Ministry and Meng Enyuan – in whose province the Railway zone was located – continued to protest Horvath’s declaration throughout the summer, they were unable to take direct action against him and his Harbin “government”.

Two different approaches were adopted instead. In Beijing, the Foreign Ministry kept Allied diplomats informed of Japan’s influence over the Whites, hoping that they would rein in the Japanese. In Manchuria, local officials acted independently in negotiating with Red and White forces over first disarmament and recruitment, and then a broad range of commercial and political questions. The former led to disappointment not only in the Siberian Intervention, which granted Japan a pre-eminent position among the Allied forces, but also in the Paris Peace Conference and the supposed “betrayal” which ceded Shandong to Japan. The latter empowered Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian clique over the centre, a dynamic which was to plunge China into yet more civil wars. If anything, the Harbin episode was one of many that illustrated the pre-eminent “lesson” of the Republican period: International goodwill was not to be trusted, and only a strong, unified centre could maintain China’s sovereign interests against foreign encroachment.

Chinese Recruits in the White Movement

In previous posts, we saw how the first wave of the Civil War in East Siberia and the Russian Far East ended in temporary defeat for the Whites. As the Allies continued to wrangle over the issue of military intervention to oust the Bolsheviks and secure Russia’s participation in World War One, they put pressure on the Beijing government to allow escaping Whites to regroup in Chinese territory. An embryonic anti-Bolshevik government was also being formed in Harbin; its military commanders, such as Ataman Semenov, soon received Allied weapons and Japanese advisors.

The Whites did not confine themselves to supplementing their arsenals. While in Chinese territory, they took the opportunity to recruit Chinese soldiers as well, much to the consternation of local officials.

Kolchak with M.M. Pleshkov, Horvath’s commander-in-chief. Probably Harbin, 1918. Source.

頃據駐哈司令部陶總司令祥貴等灰電稱：

「前准施道尹紹常咨，准俄阿木爾邊防總領薩莫意羅夫曾稱，擬募華人五百名，以為保護中東鐵路之用。當經呈請核示，未奉到指令。今又准施道尹咨，准俄軍司令官普利司闊夫照稱，擬募華人四千五百名，編成新軍，備作后路之用，委退伍華官張滿峰承辦此事，並請迅予賜覆等因。又據施道尹面稱，霍爾瓦特曾向其談及此事，希望從速照准為新編軍隊，以備后路之用。

職等查薩莫意羅夫等募此多數之人，其中良莠難齊，且恐未必為其所用命，亦不過與地方多增一份匪患而已。職等有見於此，不能不先為陳之。究竟是否允行，謹請電示，以便答復」等情。

據此，查薩氏等擬募華人充當兵役，以為后援，又以退伍華官張滿峰承辦招募之事，如果任其所為，無異以兵力相援助，一旦為新黨所知，貽人口實，必又謂我左袒哥軍，與彼開舋。況舊黨增添實力，亦非我之福，應否禁阻之處，伏乞電示飭遵。

A telegram from Harbin garrison commander Tao Xianggui, dated the 10th, reads:

‘According to a message from [Binjiang] circuit intendant Shi Shaochang, commander of the Amur border troops [M.K.] Samoilov wrote to say that he proposes to recruit 500 Chinese for the purpose of protecting the Chinese Eastern Railway. Advice was sought but no instructions received. Today, another message from circuit intendant Shi states that Russian commander [M.M.] Pleshkov has informed him of plans to recruit 4,500 Chinese, draft them into new units and employ them in the rear; discharged Chinese officer Zhang Manfeng will be tasked with this matter and a swift response was requested. And in a meeting, circuit intendant Shi informed me that Horvath had previously mentioned this matter to him, hoping that permission to draft these new units would be quickly granted, that they may be used in the rear.

‘My view is that if Samoilov etc were to recruit so many, this would include both good and bad elements, whom I fear may not necessarily follow their orders. It would be nothing more than increasing banditry in the area. I cannot but voice my opinion on this matter in advance. As for whether this should be allowed, I request your advice so that I may give them an answer.’

If the proposals by Samoilov etc to recruit Chinese for military service as rearguard reinforcements were to be permitted – including placing discharged Chinese officer Zhang Manfeng in charge of recruitment – this would be tantamount to giving them military aid. Were the Bolsheviks to learn of this, it would certainly give them grounds to say, once again, that we are siding with the cossacks, provoking their enmity. Moreover, an increase in the Whites’ strength is not necessarily to our advantage. As for whether we should prohibit this, I seek your advice and instruction.

Telegram from Meng Enyuan, 12 April 1918 (sent 11 April). Zhong-E guanxi shiliao Minguo liunian zhi banian (1917-1919). Dongbei bianfang (1), pp. 150-151.

Much has been written about Chinese soldiers in the Red Army during the Russian Civil War. As with many aspects of the diaspora during this period, exact numbers are hard to come by: A broad range of 30,000-70,000 Chinese internationalists is often cited by western historians. Given the desperate state of many Chinese wartime workers during this period, it is hardly surprising that they responded to the Bolsheviks’ recruitment efforts in large numbers. This, in turn, became fodder for White propaganda, which played on racialised imagery of Bolshevik traitors destroying Russia with the help of foreign interlopers.

This classic poster depicts Trotsky looming over the Kremlin while Chinese soldiers execute a white-clad Russian. “Peace and Freedom in Sovdepiia”, 1919. Source.

Yet Meng’s telegram clearly showed that, at least in the Russian Far East, the Whites were not averse to using Chinese manpower themselves. In his memoirs, Horvath justified Samoilov’s proposal by arguing that Tao’s garrison did not have sufficient men and weapons to effectively guard the CER. No such explanation is forthcoming for Pleshkov’s, which is particularly surprising given the number involved and his position as commander-in-chief of Horvath’s nascent anti-Bolshevik army in the Railway zone. Pleshkov’s request was thus a definite move to supplement the White war effort with Chinese soldiers. And while Horvath’s men may have thought to inform the Chinese authorities of their intentions, more independent actors – such as Semenov – paid them no such courtesy.

Beijing agreed with Meng and prohibited the drafting of Chinese into the White movement. However, this proved impossible to enforce and Meng’s warning of a clash between Russians and Chinese soon came true.

據哈爾濱司令部陶總司令祥貴、高會辦士儐哿日電稱：

「據分駐滿洲里么支隊長培珍效電稱，俄哥薩隊總領謝米諾夫前募華兵八百余名，分駐滿站東西營房。昨十八日晚因減發軍餉，西營俄官與華兵忽生衡突，俄官立將為首者捆縛二名，欲送東營大獄，當為華兵奪回。俄官復向眾開槍，華兵徒手逃竄。我軍突聞槍聲，立飭各營安段扼守，以備不虞。嗣將逃出華兵百七十名圈入戲園，並派員會同江省司令部及交涉局前往調查，並未傷人。當經江省黃參謀長及我軍王路兩營長往晤謝米諾夫，據稱，華兵萬難再用，擬即備車送至長春解散等語。復經黃參謀長等要求，每華兵一名，給予川資羌洋八元，定於廿日上車，由我加派軍官押送至哈，希接替送長，並轉電俟該華兵等解送到日，再行派員替送外，謹電聞」等情。

查俄人招募華兵一層，迭經遵照中央電令轉令實行取締，並令該司令等將招募華兵利害，向霍總辦一再剖白。乃俄人方面不聽忠告，暗中招募，今果發生事端。惟自此次衡突之后，俄人或生戒心，將來取締招兵，當易發生效力。但此項替解華兵，若不設法妥為遣散，仍恐流為匪類，貽害地方。除電飭裴旅長、陶道尹先期籌備妥為解散具報外，謹先電聞。

According to a telegram from Harbin garrison commander Tao Xianggui and manager Gao Shibin, dated the 20th:

‘In a telegram of the 19th, Manzhouli detachment commander Yao Peizhen wrote that Russian cossack leader Semenov had previously recruited more than 800 Chinese soldiers, housed in barracks to the east and west of Manzhouli station. Yesterday, on the night of the 18th, due to a reduction in pay, conflict suddenly broke out in the western barracks between the Russian officers and Chinese troops. The Russian officers immediately arrested two of the ringleaders, wishing to send them to the large jail in the eastern barracks, but they were snatched back by the Chinese soldiers. Then the Russian officers fired into the crowd and the Chinese soldiers fled empty-handed. Our forces, hearing the sudden gunfire, immediately ordered all barracks to guard their positions and prepare for any eventuality. The 170 escapee Chinese soldiers were then corralled into the theatre, and a representative was sent together with the Heilongjiang headquarters and the diplomatic bureau to investigate matters. Nobody was hurt. Heilongjiang chief of staff Huang and our battalion commanders Wang and Lu went to meet with Semenov, who said that it would be difficult to continue using Chinese soldiers and proposed to prepare trains immediately to send them to Changchun and disperse them. Huang etc have subsequently requested that each Chinese soldier be given 8 roubles’ travel expenses, and that they should embark on the 20th, with us providing additional troops to escort them to Harbin, to be replaced on the onward journey to Changchun. Once the date of the soldiers’ arrival is conveyed, these replacements can be arranged.’

On the matter of Russians recruiting Chinese soldiers, I have repeatedly ordered that this be suppressed in accordance with the Central Government’s instructions. I have also instructed Tao etc to explain the pros and cons of recruiting Chinese troops to General Manager Horvath multiple times. But the Russian side did not heed our earnest advice and recruited in secret. Now an incident has indeed occurred. After this conflict, the Russians may yet develop some prudence and future prohibition of recruitment will then be more effective. However, on the matter of the replacement escort for the Chinese soldiers, if an appropriate means of dispersing them is not found, I fear they will wander and become bandits, bringing harm to the area. Apart from instructing brigade commander Pei and circuit intendant Tao [Shi?] to prepare the means for dispersal, I present the above for your reference.

[Note: The Manzhouli garrison comprised troops from both Heilongjiang as well as Meng’s own forces from Jilin. Hence the reference to commanders from both provinces. R.L.]

Telegram from Meng Enyuan, 22 April 1918 (sent 21 April). Ibid., p. 169.

“Thus the bolshevik punitive detachments of Latvians and Chinese brutally expropriate bread, devastate villages and shoot peasants”. Anti-Bolshevik poster c.1919. Source.

Meng’s optimism was ultimately misplaced. The Whites continued to draft Chinese soldiers; as with the number of Red internationalists, though, the scale of this recruitment is difficult to determine without further research. Certainly, after the revival of the anti-Bolshevik movement in autumn 1918, Chinese troops were found in the employ of Semenov, Kalmykov and even Kolchak.

The recruitment issue underscored the divergence between White and Chinese interests. It came on top of growing tensions over border security, sovereignty in the Railway zone, and Japanese involvement. Already at this early stage, Meng was able to declare that “an increase in the Whites’ strength is not necessarily to our advantage” – words that would only gain credence as the Civil War progressed.

Counterrevolution in Harbin

In March 1918, resistance to the November Revolution entered a new phase. Early in the month the Bolsheviks and Central Powers signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, decisively ending Russia’s participation in the war. Now the Allies had even less reason to handle the Bolshevik regime with kid gloves. Armed support would be given to counterrevolutionary movements that promised to reverse the separate peace and resume Russia’s war effort. Outright intervention also commenced with the landing of British Royal Marines in Murmansk.

Chinese Eastern Railway general manager D.L. Horvath with members of the Allied interventionary forces in Vladivostok, 1918. Source.

At the same time, domestic anti-Bolshevik movements were beginning to coalesce on the peripheries of the Russian empire. We have already seen how Semenov used the Sino-Russian border as a base from which to launch an attack in early 1918. While the offensive soon lost steam and was repulsed by the Reds, this frontier was in many ways an ideal location for the Whites. Borders were porous and under-policed, giving White forces a convenient escape route. The Japanese army, keen to take advantage of Russia’s internal instability, was a source of arms and advisors. Chinese authority did not fully extend into the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, allowing Russians a relatively free hand there. At any rate, as a member of the Alliance, Beijing was obliged to turn a blind eye to the Whites’ activities. Short of invading China outright, the Reds could do little.

It was during this period that Chinese territory – in particular, the Russian enclave of Harbin and the CER – became a haven for the Whites. Anti-Bolshevik leaders rallied around Ambassador Kudashev, Railway general manager Horvath and the Russo-Asiatic Bank, which owned the CER concession and received China’s Boxer Indemnity funds. Semenov’s retreating troops formed a ready-made military wing. The Allies stood ready to aid them, transporting materiel through the CER and the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway. Despite the fact that all this was taking place in Chinese territory, the opinions of the Chinese were almost an afterthought. They were simply informed that a prospective Russian government-in-exile was being established in China.

庫使云：此次中東鐵路霍總辦、華俄銀行波總裁來京，與本使議改中東鐵路行政方法，同時議及各項問題中有最關重要之一問題，即決定在哈爾濱籌設機關。其目的仍與協商各國一致動作，雪廣義派政府與敵國單獨媾和之奇恥，並與西伯利亞政府聯合一氣，以遏制廣義派及德奧俘虜東侵之勢。其職務，外交方面由本使代表，隨時向貴國及協商各使接洽，財政由波氏籌劃，軍警由霍氏擔任。霍氏在哈埠有年，與貴國、日本及他國人信感相投，辦理此事，居高一呼，助者必眾。倘使籌備軍實足坐鎮，俾廣義派及德奧俘虜不敢東來覬覦，則種種支節問題，均足以消弭於無形，此貴國與本國共同之利益也。惟此事籌議已決，而尚未便公然宣布者，則以哈埠廣義派，雖經驅逐出境，難保絕無遺留，猶在籌備之際，此項計劃遂入該派黨徒之耳，恐將不利於霍氏，是以先由本使向貴部及協商各使密為通告。茲得本使同霍、波兩氏議決字據，送請貴總長察閱一過。
總長閱其字據畢，乃云：此紙能否留下。
庫使云：此紙系屬原本，尚擬遍送協商各使察閱，貴總長意欲存留，容飭館員打出一份送至貴部可也。
總長云：善。貴使已與英朱使談及此事否。
庫使云：今午已晤英朱使談及此事。

Kudashev: CER general manager Horvath and Russo-Chinese Bank chairman [A.I.] Putilov are now in Beijing to discuss with me a means of reorganising the administration of the CER. At the time, the most critical question among the various issues discussed was the decision to establish an organisation in Harbin. Its objectives are to preserve unity of action with the Allies, wipe away the shame of the Bolshevik government’s separate peace with the enemy, and join forces with the Siberian government in order to halt the eastward advance of the Bolsheviks and German and Austrian POWs. As for its offices, diplomatic functions will be undertaken by myself, to maintain communications with Your country and the various Allied ambassadors. Finance will be overseen by Putilov, and the army and police will be Horvath’s responsibility.
Horvath has been in Harbin for many years and enjoyed good relations with Your country, the Japanese and other nationalities. In this undertaking, his appeals will be received with widespread support. If sufficient troops were prepared and garrisoned such that the Bolsheviks and German and Austrian POWs would not dare to come eastwards with their schemes, all problems and technicalities would be eliminated to the mutual benefit of both Your country and mine.
The plans for this have been decided upon but it was not appropriate to announce them publicly. Although the Harbin Bolsheviks have already been expelled, one cannot guarantee that there are no traces of them left. Especially during the preparatory phase, it would not be in Horvath’s interests if our project were to reach the ears of that party. Hence, I am informing Your Ministry and the Allied ambassadors about this in confidence. Here is the written resolution from myself, Horvath and Putilov, if the Minister would be inclined to peruse it.
Lu, after reading the document: May I keep this paper?
Kudashev: This is the original, which I plan to present to the other Allied ambassadors. If the Minister wishes to keep it, please allow me to instruct my staff to type out a copy and send it to Your Ministry?
Lu: Good. Has Your Excellency spoken about this with British Ambassador Jordan?
Kudashev: I met him this afternoon and discussed it.

Meeting between Ambassador Kudashev and Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang, 2 March 1918. Zhong-e guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919). E zhengbian yu yiban jiaoshe (1), p. 277.

Kudashev’s seat in Beijing. Source.

Despite Kudashev’s cagey description of his group as an “organisation”, it was clear that nobody was fooled (the term used in the source, 機關 jiguan, has connotations of official-ness). Lu’s first response was to consult with the Allied diplomatic corps to express China’s reservations. In an initial meeting with Ambassador Jordan, he drew an interesting parallel between Horvath and China’s Boxer Rebellion.

總長云：俄國公使與霍爾瓦特等在北京組織一會，以抵制其國之過激派，曾對本總長言，業已告知貴公使。
朱使云：是。該會如能成立，甚善。
總長云：在本國一方面觀之，似不甚妥，因本國與俄國尚未絕交也。
朱使云：貴國政府為難之處，本公使亦甚明。
總長云：該會與前清庚子之役，李鴻章、張之洞二公在上海反對政府與各國宣戰之政策相同。其時本總長出使俄國，政府電令回國，本總長因電詢李、張二公應否遵辦，據復不必。
朱使云：李、張二公當時反對有效，甚望該會此次亦能有效也。
[批]：此會吾國應取何種態度，擬請由參司顧問分頭切實研究。

Lu: The Russian ambassador has organised a group in Beijing with Horvath and others in order to resist the Bolsheviks in their country. He spoke with me about this and has also informed your Excellency.
Jordan: Yes. If that group can indeed be established, it would be excellent.
Lu: From the perspective of my country, it is not entirely appropriate, since we have not broken off relations with Russia.
Jordan: I am well aware of the difficulties this poses for Your government.
Lu: This group is akin to the policies of Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong during the Boxer Rebellion, when they opposed the government’s declaration of war [on the western powers] from Shanghai. At the time I was ambassador in Russia. The government instructed me to return and I sent a telegram asking Li and Zhang if I should obey. They said it was unnecessary.
Jordan: Li’s and Zhang’s opposition was effective then. I very much hope that this group will also be effective.
Note: Regarding the attitude our country should take towards this group, a thorough study should be requested from the War Department’s advisors.

Meeting between Lu Zhengxiang and British Ambassador Sir John Jordan, 6 March 1918. Ibid., pp. 283-284.

Lu thus began by explicitly stating China’s ambivalence and ended with a highly charged analogy. Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong had parted ways with the Qing government in opposing the Boxers, and it was this act of insubordination that made room for peace with the imperial powers. But the resulting Boxer Protocol was perceived as a humilitating imposition on China and cost Li his life. What Jordan might have characterised as “effective” opposition was, at the same time, a painful historical memory for the Chinese.

Jordan might not have grasped the entire import of Lu’s words, but Deputy Foreign Minister Gao Erqian spoke more bluntly in another meeting on 13 March. Gao argued that White activities in China could lead to conflict with the Bolsheviks. In the face of Allied determination, however, these protests met with little sympathy. Britain, France and Japan had already decided to support the new “organisation” in Harbin. The Chinese had to allow the Whites not only to operate freely, but to arm themselves, as the following receipt from Kudashev showed. Not included were the Japanese military advisors who joined Semenov at the same time.

Semenov with one of his Japanese advisors, Captain Kuroki Chikayoshi. The original image appeared in a 1937 memorial book on Kuroki. Source.

一八九八年式快炮全份八尊。
榴彈一萬枚。
群子彈五萬枚。
一九零五年式機關槍全份五十架。
機關槍子彈二百萬粒。
手擲炸彈一萬枚。
槍放炸彈一千枚。
火箭二千枚。
十五厘徑榴彈炮全份二尊。
一九零五年式短槍三千枝。
一八九七年式來福槍二千枝。
槍子七百五十萬粒。
手槍二百枝。
手槍子二萬粒。
以上各項，由長春運往滿洲里。

1898-model cannons: Eight. Shells: 10,000. Shrapnel shells: 50,000.
1905-model machine guns: 50. Machine-gun ammunition: 2 million rounds.
Hand grenades: 10,000. Rifle grenades: 1,000. Rockets: 2,000.
15cm-calibre howitzer: Two.
1905-model carbines: 3,000. 1897-model rifles: 2,000. Ammunition: 7.5 million rounds.
Handguns: 200. Ammunition: 20,000 rounds.
The above were shipped from Changchun to Manzhouli.

Receipt from Kudashev, 18 March 1918 (sent 16 March). Ibid., pp. 301-302.

The White movement in China thus put the Chinese themselves in a difficult position. It gave the Bolsheviks ample grounds for a quarrel, increased frontier insecurity, undermined Chinese authority and extended Japanese influence. Little could be done for the time being except rein Semenov in and hope that the Allies would look kindly on Beijing’s cooperation. Unfortunately, the Chinese were to be disappointed on both counts.

Flying Forward with the Chinese Dream: Three Museums in Harbin, Part II

In a previous post, I looked at the Museum of Heilongjiang Province and its dual messages of cosmopolitan engagement and nationalist fervour. The former aligned more neatly with China’s recent moves to establish itself as an outward-facing power, the hub in a global commercial network embodied in the One Belt, One Road initiative.

Two other Harbin museums neatly demonstrate how these messages come apart. The first, based around a former section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, takes the OBOR narrative to a new level by combining old structures, new media and everyday life in a mixed-use space. The latter, an older and quieter museum in Harbin’s Nangang district, is also housed in Railway property but maintains a nationalist perspective on the city’s history.

The platform at Harbin station reimagined at the Chinese Eastern Railway Park. Photo my own, taken August 2018.

The Chinese Eastern Railway Park and Museum
(Park opened to the public in November 2016, museum in 2017. Free of charge.)

Harbin’s newest museum, located in the Chinese Eastern Railway Park, is also its most experimental. Occupying a 2.7 km-long swathe of the former CER line on either side of the 1901 Binzhou Railway Bridge, the park encompasses both the north and south banks of the Songhua River. It is difficult to tell where its boundaries lie. In fact, the park-museum complex is not a defined educational or cultural space per se but an experiential one, in which historic sites are embedded in everyday leisure activities. Exercise classes take place on the grounds in front of the museum, next to a 1950s locomotive. A terrace garden includes a reconstruction of a railway platform (see above). Visitors can cross the Songhua on the old Binzhou Bridge – decommissioned in 2014 – taking in the city’s scenery as well as explanatory signs on the bridge’s history.  Halfway across, they can leave at Sun Island, a popular weekend spot with its own cultural attractions, including an ersatz “Russian Village” and a memorial to the Anti-Japanese United Army in Manchuria.

The path to the Binzhou Railway Bridge. The new Songhua bridge which replaced it is visible on the right. Photo my own, taken August 2018.

This was a deliberate decision, as a large marble sign explains in Chinese, English and Russian:

公园以‘轨·迹’为规划设计理念，以‘老江桥’及中东铁路建筑群的保护利用为重点，对已停用铁路空间转型、拓展与重构…构建城市景观廊，绿色慢行线和中东铁路文化展示带… 中东铁路公园拉近了人与自然、时间与空间、生活与休闲的距离，向宾客讲述着哈尔滨与铁路、历史与现实、绿色与文化的故事。

Guided by the principle of ‘Track to Trace’, the planning and design of the park has given priority to protective utilisation of the Old River Bridge as well as the CER architectural complex. Moreover, the transformation, expansion and reconstruction of the disused railway space…[presents] to the public a cultural corridor embodying urban landscape, a green route for promenade [sic], and a culture display belt retracing the CER history… The CER Park has bridged the gaps between human and nature, time and space, life and leisure, telling to tourists the stories of Harbin and the railway, history and modern life, green development and culture.

In keeping with this experiential approach, the museum is named the “Chinese Eastern Railway Impressions Hall” (中东铁路印象馆). Its facade is a reconstruction of the original, art-nouveau Harbin station, although it does not occupy the exact station site. Inside, the museum attempts to convey the grandeur of the Railway complex, including a chandelier, a “riverside pavilion”, and large-screen multimedia depictions of a Harbin street and Songhua river scenery based on historic photographs.

Multimedia screen depicting the first tramways introduced to Harbin, based on a 1927 photograph. The scene filled an entire wall. Photo my own, taken August 2018.

The museum’s more traditional displays mirror those of the Museum of Heilongjiang Province, including timelines of Railway and Harbin history; photos of railway construction and Russian emigre life; and models of Harbin’s architectural highlights. Explanations are mostly in Chinese, with some English and Russian translations.

Strikingly, however, there is almost no trace of the traditional nationalist narrative that is usually applied to Russian colonisation. Instead, this period is described in the English introduction as a “change which never occurred in the past thousand years” (千古未有之变局), ushering in a period of mobility and urban development that transformed Harbin into a “Eurasian transport and trading hub” (结欧亚交通之枢纽、居华洋商埠之重心). The cultural cross-pollination that resulted “linked European and Asian civilisations” (沟通欧亚文明) and brought international fame to the city. Going further, the introduction explicitly uses the Railway as a forerunner of OBOR and references Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”:

从建国初期到改革开放，铁路联通睦邻友谊，通衢中俄经贸文化。从枢纽站到中心城，因路而兴的哈尔滨必将因路而盛。对接‘一带一路’，参与‘中蒙俄经济走廊’… 中东铁路故道旁，飞驰中国梦想。

From the early period of the new China to its reform and opening-up to the outside, the Chinese Eastern Railway promoted the friendship among neighbours and the economic, trade and cultural exchanges between China and Russia. Today, Harbin continues its ride due to the Chinese Eastern Railway, involved in the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ and the ‘Sino-Mongolian-Russian Economic Corridor’… The ‘Chinese Dream’ flies forward by the old and familiar track of the Chinese Eastern Railway [ellipsis in original].

После образования КНР, в частности в процессе реализации политики реформы и открытости Китайский Восточная железная дорога вновь стала мостом добрососедства, дружбы, торговли и культурного обмена. Сегодняшний город, появившийся возле железной дороги в качестве узловой станции, стал центральным городом, включился в стратегии ‘Один пояс – один путь’ и ‘Экономический коридор Китая, Монголии и России’, и встал на путь процветания именно благодаря железной дороге. На земле, где протянулась Китайская Восточная железная дорога, реализуется китайская мечта.

Russian railway surveyors and their Chinese guard. From the Chinese Eastern Railway Impressions Hall. Photo my own, taken August 2018.

Detailed exhibits on the Railway describe it as part of the wider Trans-Siberian network, “connecting the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans”. The 1929 Sino-Soviet conflict over the Railway and its 1935 sale to the Japanese is treated in fairly neutral terms. Even the Manchukuo administration is considered part of a chain of international engagement that gave Harbin its unique character (让哈尔滨在近代中西文明交流碰撞的进程中，具有着独特的坐标地位).

Perhaps the only traces of nationalist rhetoric come with the descriptions of Russo-Japanese involvement in Manchuria. The Treaty of Portsmouth, for example, is described in the Chinese-only text as taking place “without regard for Chinese sovereignty” (无视中国主权); Ito Hirobumi’s doomed 1909 visit to Harbin stemmed from a desire to “divide up China’s Northeast” (瓜分中国东北) with Russia. Compared to the well-worn anti-imperialist motifs found elsewhere, however, this museum and the wider park complex embody a new way of framing and presenting Harbin’s history. In an illuminating interview with some of the masterminds behind the Railway Impressions Hall, head of the Harbin municipal history research association Li Shuxiao explained that the question of foreign migrants in Railway history had been a “rather sensitive one”, but the time had come to “face up” to it openly and with equanimity. To Li, this was a sign of cultural confidence – no wonder, perhaps, when one views the high-speed trains passing on the new Songhua bridge.

The Nangang Museum. Source.

Harbin Nangang Museum
(Opened 2010, free entry, requires ID to enter. Photography prohibited.)

If the Railway Impressions Hall is expansive in its approach, this museum is at first glance far more modest, focusing mainly on Nangang’s history. During the Russian period, however, Nangang (or Novyi gorod, “New Town”) was Harbin’s administrative heart, where the Railway headquarters was located. The district therefore provides much scope for a museum; in fact, the Museum is located in the beautifully preserved former residence of the deputy director of the Railway.

In many ways, the Nangang Museum is the antithesis of the Impressions Hall. What it lacks in multimedia flash, it makes up for in atmosphere and an impressive collection of artefacts. Apart from the Binzhou Bridge, the Hall has had to recreate most of its exhibits. The Nangang Museum, however, is in the thick of former Railway buildings, and its narrow staircases and wooden corridors excite the historical imagination just as effectively. Its displays are mostly of the traditional type and in Chinese only: Photographs, maps and objects from Nangang and Harbin describing the Russian involvement in municipal development across a range of fields, such as public health, culture, education and commerce. Items from everyday life – from typewriters to tea services – add immensely to the museum’s setting.

Former residences for Russian workers on the CER. Buildings such as these can be found around the Nangang Museum. Photo my own, taken August 2018.

What I found in the explanatory sections was the same duality between a celebration of Harbin’s cosmopolitan history and anti-imperial sentiment that characterised the Provincial Museum. In Nangang, however, this was expressed in even starker terms. The first few rooms described how the people of the Northeast had “had their fill of imperialist bullying and feudalist and bureaucratic-capitalist oppression” (饱受帝国主义欺凌和封建主义、官僚资本主义压迫) between the First Opium War and 1949. Tsarist Russia and Japan turned Nangang into a colonial battlefield, as Russia “vainly attempted to swallow up the entire Northeastern region” (妄图并吞整个东北地区). Nevertheless, oppression fostered a will to resist and the people of Nangang heroically struggled for “national independence and liberation” (民族独立与解放). This aptly demonstrated “the Chinese people’s unbending and indomitable fighting spirit and profound sense of national integrity” (中国人不甘屈辱的大无畏斗争精神和崇高的民族气节). Coming before the subsequent exhibits on the contributions of Russian firefighters, teachers and vaccinators, this opening segment strikes a discordant note.

Both museums raise questions about presentation of history in China. Not only are their narratives weighted differently, their curatorial choices illuminate the tensions between the presentation of historical materials and their wholesale recreation; in other words, the use of artifice in promoting an interest in and understanding of history. In the same interview mentioned above, chief designer of the Impressions Hall Yang Hongwei explained that the museum’s final form was based on the fact that their crown jewel – the Binzhou Bridge – was outdoors, and traditional artefacts were in short supply. Cosmopolitan, cutting-edge Harbin history is therefore presented in a largely manufactured, mixed-use space that prompts reflection on China’s modernity and the new lifestyles of its people. And in Nangang, older heroic stories persist among colonial-era relics and gently crumbling Russian buildings, providing an anchor for acts of remembering.

The Original Belt and Road? Three Museums in Harbin, Part I

Over the summer, I managed to visit Harbin – one of the former epicentres of Sino-Russian entanglement – and take in a few of the city’s museums. Harbin is understandably keen to promote the Russian elements in its heritage, just as Shanghai has capitalised on its Art Deco architecture and the French Concession. The city’s main tourist thoroughfare, Zhongyang dajie – Kitaiskaia ulitsa under the Chinese Eastern Railway administration – has become something akin to a Russian theme park, with loudspeakers broadcasting “Katiusha” along the street and innumerable shops selling “Russian” souvenirs. Signs and advertisements there include Russian translations of uneven quality. Elsewhere in the city, many Russian buildings are gazetted as historic monuments and have largely avoided over-zealous “refurbishment”.

This building along Zhongyang dajie, constructed in 1914, housed the daoli branch of the Churin company. Photo my own, taken 3 Aug 2018.

This celebration of Harbin’s Sino-Russian heritage has gone up a notch with the introduction of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. OBOR, which is given top billing in the People’s Republic, aims to link China to Europe, the wider Asian continent and Africa by land and sea. Of particular interest to Harbin’s self-image is OBOR’s Silk Road Economic Belt component, a 21st-Century revival of the overland trade route from China to Europe via Eurasia. Harbin, as the hub of the former CER, is well-placed to take part in the discussions surrounding this “new Silk Road”. By positioning the CER as the “original” Economic Belt bridging East and West, Harbin can claim a privileged place in OBOR discourse.

Nevertheless, a rather different narrative of Russia’s presence in Harbin persists: That of imperial domination. In fact, the shift in the historiography from colonial antagonism to cultural cross-pollination is relatively recent. The transmission of one message or the other depends on the audience (Chinese versus foreign) and intended effect (enhancing nationalist sentiment versus emphasising Harbin’s cosmopolitan roots). In the next few posts, I’ll explore how three Harbin museums present the city’s history and give voice to one or another of these narratives.

The Museum of Heilongjiang Province. Source.

The Museum of Heilongjiang Province
(Founded 1954, free of charge, requires proof of identity to enter)

Harbin’s largest museum is located in a Sino-Russian landmark, the former Moscow Department Store building, although the interior was renovated in 2009. Its collections include artefacts from the neolithic period to the present, as well as a natural history section. Of particular interest here are the permanent exhibitions on Heilongjiang provincial history and Russian emigrant culture.

The museum was very popular on the day I visited, but this may have been due to the heavy rain. Most visitors appeared to be Chinese nationals, apart from a handful of western tourists. Visitors following museum signs arrive at the provincial history section first before moving on to the Russian emigrant exhibition.

Relief at the entrance to the Russian emigre culture exhibition. Note the Sino-Russian figures and the railway leading into the mountainous distance. From the Museum of Heilongjiang Province. Photo my own, taken 4 Aug 2018.

The provincial history exhibition, which contains explanatory text in Chinese with some uneven English translations, sets out the history of Heilongjiang from prehistoric to modern times. Most relevant here is the section on modern imperial history, detailing the development of Qing imperial control over this frontier province. On the one hand, there is a nod in the cosmopolitan direction: The tribute system imposed on border peoples is charactised as the genesis of the Northeast Asian Silk Road (形成了清代东北丝绸之路). Apart from that one instance, however, the message here is a fairly traditional and nationalist one, emphasising the Qing government’s attempts to protect its patrimony from tsarist invasion. The inhabitants of Heilongjiang province, both Han and ethnic minorities, joined forces to protect the frontier and “defend the fatherland” (维护祖国) from Russian encroachment. Emphasis is given to landmark events and individuals in the border conflict between China and Russia, such as the battle at Albazin/Yakesa (1685); the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689); the Manchu military leaders Fumingga and his son Shou Shan; and the occupation of Manchuria by the Russians and the massacre of Chinese at Blagoveshchensk during the 1900 Boxer Rebellion.

Painting of the Battle of Albazin/Yakesa in the Museum of Heilongjiang Province. Photo my own, taken 4 Aug 2018.

Some of the exhibits and their accompanying texts are fairly emotive. A large oil painting of the Battle of Yakesa describes tsarist Russia as “vainly attempting to seize our country’s territory” (妄图霸占我国的领土) in the face of “relentless struggle” (不屈不挠的斗争) by all ethnic groups. The resulting Treaty of Nerchinsk was therefore concluded on equal terms, unlike subsequent “unequal treaties”. Shou Shan’s “suicide for the nation” (自杀殉国) after his failure to halt the Russian invasion of Heilongjiang in 1900 is described at length. Photographs of his grave and a temple and stele dedicated to him are also displayed.

This nationalist message is tempered in the Russian emigre section, which opened in 2014 and has a much more modern design. Explanations are in Chinese, with some English and Russian translations. From the beginning, Harbin’s history is described as “inseparable” (离不开, “тесно связана”) from that of the CER. The Railway’s Eurasian and European links are emphasised, while Russian colonial development of the railway zone is seen as the foundation for Harbin’s modern municipal infrastructure. In terms of urban planning, the city was “entirely” designed along European-Russian lines, which gave many buildings a Russian flavour and turned Harbin into an architectural showcase. Russian migrants, in turn, made an indelible mark on the city’s way of life.

Cosmopolitan culture: Tobacco labels and promotional materials from the Lopato company featuring Western, Chinese and Manchu motifs. From the Museum of Heilongjiang Province. Photo my own, taken 4 Aug 2018.

The exhibition is quick to note that most Russian emigres who arrived after the October Revolution “were of a high cultural level” (具有较高的文化素质, “educated”, “высокая степень культурности”). Russian businesses, schools, media, religious institutions, and artistic, scientific and academic organisations all contributed to a vibrant and cosmopolitan culture (中西交融, “Sino-Western culture [sic] convergence”, “гармония китайской и европейской культуры”). Even daily life was influenced by the Russians, from customs to dress, adding to Harbin’s uniqueness and setting it apart from other cities. As the exhibition concludes: “Openness, tolerance and enterprise are unchanging characteristics of Harbiners, which will accompany this city going forward into the next century” (开放、包容与进取是哈尔滨人不变的特点，将伴随这个城市在新百年中一路前进; “открытость, снисходительность и целеустремленность – это неизменная черта харбинцев и такая черта вместе с городом пойдет вперед в новое столетие”).

Chinese boys in a Russian-run school. From the Museum of Heilongjiang Province. Photo my own, taken 4 Aug 2018.

True to its emphasis on cosmopolitanism, the exhibition does more than feature prominent emigre artists, administrators and businessmen. Many of the photographs depict sites of Sino-Russian interaction, such as schools, factories, scientific groups and the offices of the Yuandong bao newspaper. Nevertheless, there is a strong sense of a vanished world, in which the Russian emigre world comes across almost as an ethnographic curiosity. This is heightened by the final segment of the exhibition, which includes three dioramas of (somewhat romanticised) emigre life in Harbin. The dioramas provide a chance to display material objects from the period. At the same time, the Chinese-only explanatory text draws parallels between the diorama scenes to some of the “Sino-Russian” symbols of present-day Harbin: Beer (Harbin beer), sausages (especially Churin “red sausages”), bread (列巴 or lieba, from хлеб), kvass and ice cream (Hotel Modern ice lollies). While these items may have been introduced by emigres, they have become “indigenised” to varying degrees. Lieba and kvass as they are sold in Harbin are not recogniseable as typically Russian bread or kvass, while the sausages and ice cream are known under Chinese-owned, sinified brand names (秋林红肠, 马迭尔冰棍).

One of three dioramas of Russian emigre life. From the Museum of Heilongjiang Province. Photo my own, taken 4 Aug 2018.

As the newer of the two exhibitions, the Russian emigre section is clearly more “on brand” in an era where China’s aspirations are assuming concrete and global forms. Simultaneously, it allows the city to express a degree of regional and municipal pride as distinct from wider national sentiment. Yet the maintenance of a nationalist narrative, which mirrors that of the even more strident Aihui History Museum (refurbished 2011), shows that such messages are not obsolete. Cosmopolitanism therefore coincides with a sustained awareness of China’s national prerogatives. After all, if China is to resume its historic role in the “new Silk Road”, it must redefine itself in more expansive ways.

A Warlord, His Sugar and the Russians(?) Who Made It

Envelope from the Hulan Sugar Refinery, possible date 1911-1927. Source.

As the archival sources are somewhat sparse in the lead-up to the July Days – Beijing in June 1917 was, after all, in the throes of a full-scale political crisis – this post makes a small detour to an interesting standalone document from later in the summer. In August 1917, Manchurian potentate and leader of the Fengtian warlord clique Zhang Zuolin wrote to the Foreign Ministry regarding a new contract for the Russian staff at the Hulan Sugar Refinery, located in a district of Harbin.

In Manchuria, the cultivation of sugar beets and the production of sugar therefrom were intimately linked to Russian imperial influence. Sugar beets were introduced to the region by Polish entrepreneurs, who established a refinery in Acheng around 1908. The Hulan facility was its main Chinese-owned competitor. Also founded in 1908 as Fuhua Sugar Refinery, a limited company, it was taken over by the Manchurian authorities in 1911 and renamed the Three Eastern Provinces Hulan Sugar Refinery. Lack of specialist manpower, however, obliged the Hulan Refinery to employ Russian nationals. This document sets out some of the administrative hurdles involved.

(Unfortunately, the names of all the Russian staff are listed in Chinese transliteration, making it difficult to determine who they were. Given the heavy involvement of Poles in Manchuria’s sugar industry, it is not unlikely that they were in fact Polish.)

案查東三省呼蘭制糖廠於民國四年八月聘用俄人干挐爾士基為該廠總技師一節，當經咨明查照在案。茲據該廠長轉呈該技師因病辭職，請將原定合同作廢等語，當經令照准，並飭規劃接替辦法去后。現據呈復稱：

「為遵令規劃技士擔負責任辦法，俾資遵守，祈鑒核施行事：竊查本廠具呈，總技師干挐爾士基辭職離廠，並繳還原訂合同等情一案，奉鈞署指令，據呈報，該廠總技師干挐爾士基辭職離廠，並繳還合同各情形均悉，應准備案。所有制糖部份，應如何規劃，方免臨時貽誤，仰即擬定辦法呈報查核，此令等因。奉此，自應遵照辦理。

查本廠原有俄技師工匠，雖由公家給與工資，然其來廠，皆經總技師干挐爾士基依照合同雇佣。現在該總技師辭職，既奉批准原訂合同取銷，其俄技匠等當然隨之失其在廠服務資格。惟制糖事宜系屬專技，須借材異域。值此歐戰，另募維艱，僅就原有者酌善留用，計技師三名，工匠八名，較原合同共減五名，均已繼續供職，以免貽誤。

復以制造關系至鉅，如無統屬專員擔負責任，遇事難免諉卸，殊非慎重之道。查機器師綿力查爾克、制糖師雅士切爾、化學師羅錦比爾等三人，技藝嫻熟，品性端方，上年制造，頗資得力。予以專責，尚能勝任。經與商榷，均願共負完全責任。茲經酌定俄文規章十六條，各予簽字，俾資遵守。其有事繁，人不敷用，臨時再雇副手佐理，並募工匠，俾資驅策。似此辦法，責有攸歸，款無虛糜。庶於責成之中，仍寓撙節公款之意。是否有當，除分別委任飭令照常供職並將約定規章存案外，理合譯錄呈請鑒核轉咨」等情。

據此，除指示並分咨外，相應鈔同附件，咨請貴部查照備案。

Records show that the Three Eastern Provinces Hulan Sugar Refinery in August 1915 employed the Russian Ganaersiji [Konarskii?] as its chief technician. Now, the factory manager has conveyed that this technician has resigned due to illness, asking that the original contract be voided. I approved this and instructed that replacements be arranged. Here is the reply:

‘Regarding the implementation of [your] instructions to arrange for technicians for the post. Our Refinery wrote that Chief Technician Ganaersiji had resigned and left the facility, returning the original contract. We then received your instructions that Ganaersiji’s resignation and the return of the contract were noted. As for how the refining operatons should be arranged, plans should be drawn up in order to avoid disruptions when the time came. Having received this, we complied and carried it out.

Although our Refinery’s existing Russian technicians and workmen are paid out of the public purse, their presence at the Refinery was due to Chief Technician Ganaersiji, who employed them based on the contract. Now that said Chief Technician has resigned, and now that approval has been granted to abolish the original contract, these technicians and workmen will naturally lose their capacity to work in the Refinery as a result. However, sugar refining is a specialist skill and capable people must be found abroad. With the European War, further recruitment is extremely difficult. It is only because of this that we are retaining some existing staff after careful consideration: three technicians and eight workmen, five fewer than in the original contract. All are continuing in their posts to avoid disruption.

Further, as production matters are considerable, if there is no chain of command or responsible superior, shirking will be unavoidable when issues arise. This is certainly not a prudent course of action. Mechanic Mianlichaerke, refining specialist Yashiqieer and chemist Luojinbier are all three well-skilled and honest in character, and were very capable in the refining operations last year. If responsibilities are granted to them they will certainly succeed. After discussions with them, they all agreed to take on full responsibilities. A 16-point list of regulations was drawn up in Russian and each of them signed it. If matters prove too complicated and manpower is insufficient, then further assistants and workmen may be hired. It seems to us that this arrangement delegates responsibility without being financially extravagant. In the assignment of duties we kept to the principle of economising on public funds. As for whether this is appropriate, apart from instructing the appointees to continue at their posts and keeping the regulations on file, a translation is enclosed for your approval.’

A copy of the appendix is presented for Your Ministry’s reference.

The Catholic church in Hulan, built 1908. Source.

The attached contract provides a glimpse into the terms of employment for Russian staff. Written contracts were nothing new for Chinese firms, but it is interesting to see non-Chinese employees involved in longstanding contractual practices. Of particular note is the emphasis on appointing managers taking “full responsibility” for operations, a practice then prevalent among many Chinese firms. Under Point 12, moreover, the Refinery’s profits were to be shared among technical specialists as well as workmen, in addition to their salaries. This was in keeping with Chinese business practices of the time and considered unusual by non-Chinese entrepreneurs.

約定規章
第一條：本規章俄技師工匠均應遵守，其約定辦法如左。
第二條：技師等擔負關於廠內一切制造責任（但對於工作部分內應用之件，由技師先期知會本廠及時預備，否則咎歸貽誤者）。
第三條：關於制造事務，技師等須和衷共濟，互相輔助，商同辦理。如有意見不同之處，取決之廠長。
第四條：服務無誤者，酌予獎勵，否則辭退，以示平允。
第五條：指揮廠內工作，由技師行之。
第六條：黜陟俄技師工匠，由廠長行之。
第七條：無論俄技師工匠，在廠制造時間及在制造期前二個月，均不得辭職出廠。其此以外時間，如欲離職者，須於一個月前通知本廠。
第八條：本廠如有裁減俄技師工匠時，須於一個月前通知，並發給兩月恩薪。
第九條：凡俄工匠如有紊亂廠規，由華員與技師評議確定者，隨時撤退，並不得享受第八條之待遇。
第十條：俄技師每年例假二個月，工匠每二年例假二個月，其分配日期由技師會商妥協稟呈廠長核准行之。
第十一條：華工遇有請假者，由監工員取得技師同意后，呈請廠長核准施行。
第十二條：在制造完竣后，營業如果獲利，俄技師工匠得享受分給花紅。共數目須視服務勤惰，技藝良否，由廠長酌定后，呈請省長核准施行。
第十三條：於職務應辦事項外，如有發表意見之處，俄技師直陳於廠長，工匠陳由技師轉達，聽候採擇。
第十四條：本廠習學制造學生，由技師等擔任義務教授，且課其速成。
第十五條：俄技師工匠得享受醫士救護並藥料。
第十六條：本規章自廠長技師簽字呈奉省長批准之日施行。
廠長寶興。簽字。
機器師綿力查爾克。簽字。
化學師羅錦比爾。簽字。
制糖師雅士切爾。簽字。

Regulations
1. These regulations must be honoured by all Russian technicians and workmen, with the provisions as below.
2. Technicians etc are responsible for all production duties in the refinery (however, regarding items necessary for the work, technicians are to inform the factory managers in advance to prepare them promptly. If not, the responsibility will be borne by those causing the disruption.)
3. In all production matters, technicians must pull together, assisting one another and working in concert. If there are differences in opinion, the decision lies with the factory manager.
4. Those with error-free work will be considered for awards. Conversely, [those making errors] will be dismissed as a sign of fairness.
5. Technicians will direct the work within the refinery.
6. The promotion or demotion of Russian technicians and workmen will be carried out by the factory manager.
7. Both Russian technicians and workmen may not resign and leave the refinery during the production process, as well as for two months before. At other times, those who wish to resign must give one month’s notice to the refinery.
8. If the factory wishes to cut back on Russian technicians and workmen, it must give one month’s notice and give two months’ compassionate pay.
9. Any Russian technician or workman who violates refinery regulations and has been jointly ruled on by the Chinese staff and technicians can be dismissed at any time. Moreover, they will not receive the pay set out in Point 8.
10. Russian technicians are entitled to two months’ holiday a year, workmen to two months’ holiday every two years. The allocation of dates will be decided after the technicians have discussed and applied for them with the factory manager, for his approval.
11. If Chinese workers apply for leave, their supervisor must obtain the technicians’ agreement before applying to the factory manager for approval.
12. At the end of the production process, if the business proves profitable, Russian technicians and workmen will receive bonuses. The total amount will depend on diligence and level of skill shown. This will be determined by the factory manager before seeking the Governor’s [Zhang Zuolin’s] approval.
13. Apart from essential work, if opinions arise, technicians should present them directly to the factory manager and workmen to the technicians, who will forward them and await a decision.
14. Technicians etc will serve as voluntary teachers for students studying the production process at the refinery and will teach them the skills quickly.
15. Russian technicians and staff will receive medical care and medicines.
16. These regulations take effect with the signatures of the factory manager and technicians, and upon approval by the Governor.

Signed
Factory manager Bao Xing
Mechanic Mianlichaerke [Mel’nichak?]
Chemist Luojinbier
Refining specialist Yashiqieer

Deng Ruyan, Guo Tingyi and Hu Qiuyuan (eds.) Zhong-E guanxi shiliao: Dongbei
bianfang (1), Minguo liunian zhi banian. (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi
yanjiusuo, 1960), pp. 34-36.

Street in Hulan. Source.

Zhang’s degree of involvement in a single sugar refinery was not unusual. In fact, it was part of a coordinated programme of economic development involving railways, ports, textile mills, timber, soybean and coal on the one hand and more efficient taxation on the other. Capital, funds, manpower and technology were mustered and deployed by Zhang and his subordinates to grow the wealth of the Manchurian administration, partly in aid of military adventures to the south, but also as a counterweight to Russian and Japanese economic clout.

The Hulan Refinery, like Zhang’s own Manchurian project, was shortlived. In 1927, the falling price of sugar forced the Refinery to change tack, focusing on electricity generation and brewing instead. Following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, it was absorbed into a larger sugar refining corporation and reduced to one of its production facilities. The refinery outfit was taken over by the Harbin municipality in 1948 and commenced operations again in 1949; today, its premises are occupied by the Heilongjiang University of Science and Technology’s gymnasium.

As for the Polish-founded sugar refinery in Acheng, which was under non-Chinese ownership until 1950, the following interview with the late Professor Gregory Grossman of UC Berkley sheds light on its operations:

Policing Post-Tsarist Harbin

Seat of the Harbin administration, where the railway police was headquartered from 1908. Source.

After the March Revolution, the situation in Harbin was highly ambiguous. New legislative and executive structures, staffed by moderate merchants and professionals, coexisted with the considerable authority of the Chinese Eastern Railway administration, which was headed by tsarist holdover D.L. Horvath. In June 1917 the newly-formed Harbin Soviet was added to the political maelstrom. While the new legislature struggled to keep the status quo in the city, it refused any political innovation until the convening of the Constituent Assembly in Russia, even as its power was challenged by Horvath on the right and the Soviet on the left.

Because of the city’s location within China’s borders, events among the Russians in Harbin were of particular interest to Chinese officials. On one level, their impact on local law and order was immediate, unlike more remote goings-on in Vladivostok or Petrograd. On another level, they informed China’s active, ongoing efforts to reclaim sovereignty over the CER zone. This was a live issue which animated the Beijing government, warlords and merchants alike, and local actors were not averse to making gains at the Russians’ expense if the opportunity arose. The following message from Jilin Military Governor and warlord Meng Enyuan, re-paragraphed in the English translation, furnishes an early example of this opportunism.

吉林督軍公署咨為哈埠不靖，暫撥陸軍改編警備隊，變通辦理，以衛商民，而安地方，咨請查照事：案查自俄國革命以來，該國軍人盛倡自由，皆不執行職務，且時有不規則之行為，俄官莫能制止。我國商民行旅，往往受其侵害，內地胡匪，趨腥赴羶，亦將潛滋匿跡，為患堪虞。額設警察本極單弱，不敷分布，而移駐陸軍則為條約所不許，設不設法維持，則民戶商旅將成甌脫。迭與省長籌商審處，按從前天津辦法，以陸軍改易警察服裝，撥往該埠，凡我商民住在處所分段梭巡，實行保護彈壓，令行第二混成旅，就駐防扶余縣之步一團第一營內撥調兩連，由營長安紹彬率帶，於五月三十日改易服裝，開撥到哈。飭據通省警務處處長趙憲章、團長李恩榮會擬辦事權限規則，與該處警察聯合一氣，以期周妥，分別刊給關防鈴記，以昭信守。此項隊伍，即定名曰警備隊，營長改稱隊長，連長曰巡官，遇有呈報事件，仍由團轉旅，以次遞呈，其行文程式，對本團部則稱司令部，以符名實。

自該隊抵哈以來，地方甚為安謐，人心亦極鎮定。惟該處雜物昂貴異常，官長兵丁薪餉所入不敷用度，不得不額外津貼，及換易服裝、租賃駐所等費，飭由財政廳籌撥，准其作正開報。以俟時局大定，警力充足，再行察酌情形調回原防。所有編制原由，理合備文咨請大部查核備案，核復施行。

From the Jilin Military Governor’s office, regarding disturbances in Harbin and the temporary dispatch of troops reorganised as a police unit as a compromise measure, in order to protect merchants and secure the area. Since the Russian revolution, the soldiers of that country have been aggressive and free, all are shirking their duties and unlawful behaviour sometimes occurs. Russian officials can hardly restrain them. Our merchants and travellers often suffer their encroachments. Bandits from the interior, taking advantage of the [Russian soldiers’] clout, will stealthily increase their presence and one fears they will bring trouble.

The existing allocation of police is already extremely meagre and insufficient. Moreover, the transfer of troops is not permitted by the [CER] treaty. If a way is not found to maintain things, households, merchants and travellers will find themselves in no man’s land. I have discussed a solution with the provincial governor several times, namely, to follow the Tianjin precedent and dress troops in policemen’s clothes, deploying them in that town [Harbin] to patrol all areas where our merchants live, where they will act as protection and deterrent. I instructed that the 2nd Mixed Brigade, as well as two companies from the First Battalion of the First Infantry Regiment stationed in Fuyu County, should be placed under the command of Battalion Commander An Shaobin, issued with new uniforms on 30 May, and dispatched to Harbin. Chief of the provincial police Zhao Xianzhang and Regimental Commander Li Enrong were instructed to draw up guidelines regarding its procedures and authority, allowing it to work in concert with the police and to ensure proper conduct. Separately, an official seal and stamp were issued as a mark of authority. This formation was designated as a guard unit, with the battalion commander renamed as the captain of the guard and the company commanders as patrol officers. Matters of report would be conveyed from the Regiment to the Brigade and presented in the proper order. In the documentation, the Regiment should be referred to as the headquarters, to reflect the reality of the situation.

Ever since the unit reached Harbin, the area has been very peaceful and people are calm. However, all manner of goods are unusually expensive there and the salaries of both officers and men are not enough to meet their expenses. There was no alternative but to supplement their allowance. Together with the costs of changing their uniforms, renting a base etc, I have instructed that the funds will be paid out by the finance bureau according to a formal itemised report. Once the situation has settled and police strength is ample, further enquiries can be made before recalling [the troops] to their original posts. The origins of this deployment are set out for Your Ministry’s reference and I await any further instructions.

Message from Jilin Military Governor Meng Enyuan, 2 July 1917 (sent 29 June). Zhong-e guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919). E zhengbian yu yiban jiaoshe (1), p. 120.

This document dovetails nicely with an earlier one from Binjiang circuit intendant Li Hongmo. Li, a civilian official under Meng’s authority, had earlier reported on the March Revolution in Harbin, expressing concern about a possible deterioration in law and order after these events. Although Horvath maintained that he was in charge of the situation, Li was sceptical about his powers over the Russian guard in the railway zone. This scepticism was borne out and Meng – who had ultimate control over the deployment of Chinese troops in the province – took matters into his own hands. A Tianjin native, Meng was able to draw upon experiences in another semi-colonial city to deploy Chinese troops to Harbin in direct and knowing contravention of the Sino-Russian railway treaty. In fact, Li’s earlier telegram suggests that Meng may have planned this as early as March itself, when Chief of Police Zhao had first been placed on alert.

Meng may have taken the initiative in this matter, but his actions subsequently received the full approval of the Beijing government. It also seems that his troops were not directly challenged by the Russian authorities, perhaps because they confined themselves to patrolling areas where Chinese merchants congregated rather than making obvious inroads into the concession zone. Nevertheless, the emphasis on safeguarding Chinese merchants highlights another important trend: the use of civilian protection to achieve wider political aims. As this example demonstrates, the need to defend Chinese citizens or migrants could be used as an unimpeachable justification for a wide range of policy goals, from the deployment of troops to trade embargoes and diplomatic leverage. In the Harbin case, it was intimately linked to the restoration of Chinese control over the CER zone.

The Chinese were not alone in using such tactics. During this period, the Japanese were also adept at linking diaspora protection to political gains. For Chinese officials, however, this was a particularly compelling weapon in their diplomatic arsenal given the large number of their compatriots in the Sino-Russian borderlands. For Meng, this was another leaf in an opportunistic playbook at a time of Russian weakness.

Japanese Troops in Vladivostok and Harbin?

Japanese in Pologaia ulitsa, Vladivostok. Source.

The Russian revolutions of 1917 had to contend not only with domestic issues, but also the overlapping, cross-border interests of Russia’s neighbours. In the Far East, Japan had already established itself as a force to be reckoned with after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905; Japanese fishing, trade and railway administration often came into direct conflict with Russian interests. China had itself been on the receiving end of Japanese imperial expansion in Northeast Asia, especially after Japan cemented its influence over Korea following the First Sino-Japanese War. All parties in this three-cornered fight were alive to the possibilities created by the upheavals in Russia. As the following intelligence report from Jilin governor Meng Enyuan shows, there was an awareness that the Japanese could take advantage of the revolution to make gains at Russian expense.

案據密探報稱：

「俄國此次政變，多賴軍人勢力以成，於是該國軍人盛倡自由，肆無忌憚。近兩月來，海參崴，哈爾濱等處中日商民，被俄兵搶擾者，日有所聞。聞駐崴、哈兩埠日領屢向俄領交涉，約束俄兵，終屬無效，日人因此借口對俄提出要求條件，計有四項：（一）海參崴所駐俄軍，須受日政府限制。（二）日人須在崴埠設立警察。（三）崴埠稅務須歸日政府監督。（四）須割崴埠半境歸日政府管理，海港內准日人屯駐軍艦等因。並探聞日人現由東京運至崴埠軍隊甚夥，且有軍艦十六艘，同時到海參崴。日內又有由奉天來哈便裝日人三千余，均暗帶手槍，陸續赴哈匿居租界。」各等情，報告到署。

查該報告所云，如果成為事實，關系我國至深且巨，即於艷日電令濱江道尹李鴻謨詳查去后。茲據復稱，接密艷電敬悉，聞有日兵艦十余艘駛至崴埠附近之莫口崴地方，俄官向詰來意，尚在交涉。並有日兵約八百名，均著便服，以裝卸日輪米豆為說，由崴埠登岸，俄兵不能制止。探報所稱，便裝日人帶槍赴哈匿居等語，或即指此。至日人向俄有無各項要求，探明另稟等請電復前來。

據此，除飭偵探嚴密偵查，隨時具報外，相應備文咨請鈞院查照施行。

According to a confidential intelligence report:

‘The outbreak of the current revolution in Russia was largely dependent on the power of the soldiers. Hence, the soldiers of that country are loudly proclaiming their freedom and are utterly unrestrained. In the past two months, cases of Chinese and Japanese merchants in Vladivostok, Harbin and elsewhere being robbed and harrassed by Russian troops have been heard of daily. It is said that the Japanese consuls in the two ports of Vladivostok and Harbin have negotiated with the Russian consuls in order to rein in the Russian soldiers, but to no effect. The Japanese have therefore used this as a pretext to make demands of the Russians. There are four of them: First, the Russian troops stationed in Vladivostok must be limited by the Japanese government. Second, the Japanese must be able to establish a police force in Vladivostok. Third, Vladivostok taxation is to come under Japanese government supervision. Fourth, half of the territory of Vladivostok is to be partitioned off and managed by the Japanese government and Japanese military craft must be allowed to berth in the harbour. Moreover, it was heard that the Japanese are now despatching a great many troops from Tokyo to Vladivostok, and 16 Japanese warships have arrived in Vladivostok at the same time. Within a few days more than 3,000 Japanese troops also arrived in Harbin from Fengtian in mufti, all carrying concealed handguns, coming to Harbin in succession to secretly take up residence in the concession zone.’ These matters have been reported to the governor’s office.

If the statements in this report are true, the impact on our country will be immense. Hence, on the 29th, Binjiang daoyin Li Hongmo was instructed to make a detailed inquiry. His reply stated that the confidential telegram of the 29th had been received, and he had heard that more than ten Japanese military craft had sailed to the Pos’et Bay area near Vladivostok. Russian officials questioned them as to their reason for coming and negotiations were still under way. Furthermore, around 800 Japanese soldiers, all in mufti, have landed in Vladivostok on the pretext of loading and unloading grain and soybeans from Japanese ships. Russian troops were unable to stop them. The Japanese troops in civilian clothes carrying guns and secretly residing in Harbin mentioned in the intelligence report may be referring to these soldiers. As for whether the Japanese have made any demands of the Russians, he would make further inquiries and report separately.

In this regard, apart from instructing our agents to carry out confidential investigations and report at any time, this message is conveyed for the Council’s reference.

Letter from the State Council conveying a message from the Jilin governor, 2 July 1917. Zhong-e guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919). E zhengbian yu yiban jiaoshe (1), pp. 120-121.

The report of Japanese intervention in Vladivostok and Harbin turned out to be  somewhat exaggerated. As Li Hongmo’s telegram clarified, there was certainly no immediate impetus or justification for the Japanese to station large numbers of troops in Vladivostok. Like the other wartime Allies, Japan had recognised the Provisional Government. Japanese concerns largely centred around the fear that the post-March regime would be unable to pursue the war effectively. More critical was the perceived growth in American influence in summer 1917, with the arrival of the Root Commission – in charge of arranging financial and technical assistance for the Provisional Government – and the establishment of the Russian Railway Service Corps, which would help to manage the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern railways. At this early stage, however, it was certainly unlikely that demands would have been made to the Vladivostok authorities outright, or that any show of force from Japanese soldiers and warships would develop into outright intervention.

Chinese hypervigilance aside, several key issues emerge from this report. Diaspora protection – especially in an environment where Russian troops ran riot – could be used as a convenient pretext for intervention. Both Chinese and Japanese authorities maintained this tool in their diplomatic arsenal; subsequent events in the Russian Civil War showed that they did not shy away from using it when the possibility arose. Similarly, Chinese authorities were not averse to using the same tactics they so decried in the Japanese. After the November Revolution, a Japanese warship was indeed stationed in Vladivostok, but the Chinese also joined in with their own vessel. And as the pressure for intervention mounted after the Bolsheviks’ peace talks, the Chinese and Japanese governments concluded a secret military pact in May 1918 enabling Japanese troops to be transported freely along the CER into Russian territory.

It is important also not to make too much of the anti-Japanese rhetoric in Chinese documents. The Anhui Clique, which dominated the Beijing government during this period, was not averse to doing deals with the Japanese where it might suit the Clique’s aims of reunifying China. In January 1917, just a few months before this report, Prime Minister Duan Qirui had concluded the first of the Nishihara Loans with Japan, granting the Japanese greater influence in Shandong and Manchuria in return.

In sum, the post-revolutionary dynamic between Russian disorder and neighbourly opportunism was not confined to the Japanese, as this Chinese intelligence report might suggest. Rather, both Chinese and Japanese players were eager to make use of events in Russia to further their own interests. Neither felt that it could afford to “fall behind” in the regional power struggle and both countries often made use of the same playbooks in their post-revolutionary activities. The primary difference, perhaps, was that Japan was able to act on a larger scale than the Chinese were – to the latter’s chagrin.

The Provisional Government Period in Harbin

Pre-1911 Chinese officials of the Jilin foreign affairs bureau and Chinese Eastern Railway staff. Source.

In an earlier post, we examined a Chinese report on the March 1917 uprisings in Harbin as a case study of the complexities of revolution in a Russian colony. The railway zone was, after all, a sharply contested territory, in which Chinese sovereignty had not been ceded for good. Such ambiguities only deepened as 1917 wore on, as illustrated by the following letter by Jilin governor Guo Zongxi on the post-revolutionary administration of Harbin. The English text has been re-paragraphed.

案查哈爾濱旅居俄僑變政后各項情形，業陸續咨報在案。現在又據探報，本埠俄人所組之臨時執行部，其內部共分兩部：曰立法部，系各界暨各團體代表集合而成。凡遇本埠一切大小問題以及紳民懇請事件，皆由此部集合全體代表而議定之，開議時即以法律師阿立山大羅夫為議長，其定議案之法，取大多數代表贊同為決定，既定之后，即直接施行於本埠各機關，如中東鐵路公司及各級審判廳、檢查廳、巡警廳等處。又曰委員會，系由立法部議員內推定數人，專為執行立法部所頒布之議案，並接收呈紙，延見來賓，對答外界責問之人，暨對於各機關及個人辦理一切交際事項。此會中會長亦系阿立山大羅夫，有時阿氏一人辦理，不及則以倭立佛維赤代之，倭氏系本埠商人。其會中內部文牘事宜，則以法律師喀紫羅孚斯基擔任之。臨時執行部成立之后，至今無更變，探其原因，系因俄國中央新政府現已有召集正式國會之舉，必俟正式國會開議之后，議定全國一致辦法頒布到哈，彼時方能從事變更一切。現在臨時執行部委員會會長阿立山大羅夫氏，系因其平素主持民主之論，出於熱誠，且其為人和平親藹，向無偏激之論，故此次得被推舉為立法部議長兼執行委員會會長。現出[除]阿氏之外，最有勢力者為倭立佛維赤氏與王爵顧庫壽氏。按倭立佛維赤氏系本部商人，乃俄籍之猶太人，王爵顧庫壽氏系本埠俄亞銀行總經理。此外尚有法律師喀紫羅孚斯基以議員身份而兼任委員會之秘書。又日前德升帶同翻譯，面訪阿氏，談及現在諸事均未就緒，但少年軍人急躁過甚，欲使之稍安勿躁，甚覺不易云云。

又據該會議院某某聲稱，此次革命發生之初，俄國人民對於中東鐵路界內之一切行政布置，均不滿意，急欲乘此大亂，一舉而推翻之，軍人對此節更覺激烈，當即召集各代表秘密討論至十余日之久。旋由阿立山大羅夫等出席建言，略謂中東路界乃我俄羅斯租佃地之性質，租戶在所租地內宜守永久不易之約，不得朝令夕改，致使地主生疑，凡一切改絃更張之事，行之於我國內地則可，若行之於中國租地內則不可。此語嗣為全體承認，各代表均無爭執之言。由此觀之，雖俄國內地之更張，現尚不能預定，而東省中東鐵路界內，想不能有大更變矣等請。

據此，除咨呈國務院暨分咨內務、陸軍部外，相應咨請大部查照。

Regarding the various post-revolutionary circumstances of the Russian migrants living in Harbin, successive reports have been made and are on file. Now, according to an intelligence report, the Executive Committee formed by the Harbin Russians is internally divided into two sections. The legislative section is formed from the assembled representatives of the various social groups and organisations. All matters in Harbin large or small, or gentry and popular petitions are decided by a meeting of the whole body of representatives. During their meetings, the lawyer Aleksandrov acts as chairman, and proposals are decided on via the approval of the majority of delegates. Once a decision has been made, it is directly implemented in the various organisations in Harbin, such as the Chinese Eastern Railway Company or the courts, inspectorates and police of different levels.

The other section is a committee comprising a few people elected by members of the legislative section, dedicated to implementing the proposals promulgated by that section, as well as receiving correspondence, meeting guests and answering external inquiries. In other words, it manages all institutional and personal communications. This committee is also headed by Aleksandrov. He sometimes handles matters alone, but when unable to he is replaced by Vol’fovich, who is a Harbin merchant. The committee’s internal paperwork is handled by the lawyer Kozlovskii [unsure of name – ed.].

Since the establishment of the Executive Committee, it has not undergone any changes until now. Upon investigation, the reason is that the new central government in Russia now plans to call a Constituent Assembly, and it is necessary to wait until the Assembly has opened, decided on a unified solution for the entire country and promulgated it in Harbin. Only then can anything be changed.

The current chairman of the Executive Committee, Aleksandrov, staunchly upholds democratic views, which are warm and sincere. He behaves in a peaceable and friendly way, never expressing extreme opinions. Hence, he was elected as the head of the legislative section as well as of the [communications] committee. Now, apart from Aleksandrov, the most influential individuals are Vol’fovich and Prince Kugushev [G.G. Kugushev – ed.]. Vol’fovich is a Harbin merchant and a Russian Jew, while Prince Kugushev is the managing director of the Russo-Asiatic Bank in Harbin. Apart from them, the lawyer Kozlovskii as a member of the assembly also serves as the secretary of the [communications] committee.

A few days ago De Sheng [probably a traditional courtesy name – ed.] went with a translator to meet Aleksandrov. The conversation touched on how matters are still not ripe at present, but youths and soldiers are overly impetuous. He felt that calming them would not be easy.

Furthermore, according to one of the Committee members, when the current revolution occurred the Russian people were entirely dissatisfied with all the administrative arrangements in the CER zone. They were anxious to use it as an opportunity for an uprising to topple the administration in one stroke. At this juncture the soldiers were especially fired up, and a secret meeting was immediately called that debated matters for more than ten days. Whereupon Aleksandrov etc came with a statement, saying in effect that the CER zone had the character of one of their Russian concessions. Tenants in a leasehold should abide by their agreements unfailingly, not change their decrees in the course of a day, giving rise to the landlord’s suspicion. All innovations may take place in Russia’s domestic territory but cannot be implemented in Chinese leaseholds. These words were then approved by the entire body, with no objections from any of the delegates. From this it may be seen that although Russia’s domestic reforms are now still unpredictable, it seems that no great changes may be seen in the Railway zone in Manchuria.

Regarding these matters, apart from submitting a report to the State Council and Interior and Army ministries, a copy is despatched for your Ministry’s reference.

Letter from Jilin governor Guo Zongxi, 25 May 1917 (sent 22 May). Zhong-e guanxi shiliao, Minguo jiunian zhi banian (1917-1919). E zhengbian yu yiban jiaoshe (1), pp. 100-101.

“Outstanding in all the universe”. Inscription by Guo Zongxi, dated April 1917, on the grave of revolutionary leader Huang Xing in the Yuelu Mountains, Changsha. Huang had been one of Sun Yat-sen’s chief supporters; Guo’s choice of text compares him to Confucius. Source.

Guo’s account of the new administration in Harbin reveals several uncanny parallels with the situation in Russia. There was the widespread dissatisfaction with the pre-revolutionary governance of the Railway zone, which was not fully addressed by the incoming Executive Committee. The backgrounds of the leaders mentioned by Guo are somewhat obscure. Chairman V.I. Aleksandrov in particular seems to have been rather wealthy, as part-owner of the Hotel Moderne in Harbin. Marc Kasanin’s memoirs, China in the Twenties, mentions a lawyer named Kozlovsky who had taken part in the 1905 Revolution in Harbin (Kasanin 1973, p. 131), and Vol’fovich may have been a Socialist Revolutionary (Robert Scalapino and George Yu, Modern China and its Revolutionary Process, p. 590). Nevertheless, like the Provisional Government, the Executive Committee was staffed by “bourgeois” moderates from trade or the professions.

At the time of writing a unified Harbin Soviet of workers and soldiers had not yet been formed – it would only come into existence in June – but, as in Russia, soldiers had already overtaken moderate reformers in their radicalism. The desire for further political change was met with calls for patience. No more innovations could take place until the Constituent Assembly was convened – a delay that proved fatal for the Provisional Government in Russia, as in Harbin.

However, there was an additional reason for the Executive Committee to prevaricate. As Aleksandrov pointed out, the Railway zone was technically a leasehold where Chinese and Russian control were entangled. Rash administrative decisions might not only contravene the 1896 Sino-Russian treaty that established the zone, they could also invite legitimate Chinese intervention. More than in Russia itself, the revolutionary movement in Harbin had to contend with the sovereign rights of another state.

Frustration with the “frozen” state of affairs in Harbin would soon reach a head. As summer turned to autumn, the Bolsheviks would soon gain power in the newly-constituted Harbin Soviet, as they did in Russia itself. Waiting in the wings was Railway general manager Horvath, who represented pre-revolutionary authority and was a known quantity to the Chinese. Events in Petrograd would soon be mirrored thousands of miles away in the Railway zone, with one crucial difference: Chinese officials were waiting for the opportunity to act.